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ABSTRACT
Conventional histories of the Constitution largely omit Natives.
This Article challenges this absence and argues that Indian affairs
played a key role in the Constitution’s creation, drafting, and
ratification. It traces two constitutional narratives about Indians: a
Madisonian and a Hamiltonian perspective. Both views arose from
the failure of Indian policy under the Articles of Confederation, when
explicit national authority could not constrain states, squatters, or
Native nations. Nationalists agreed that this failure underscored the
need for a stronger federal state, but disagreed about the explanation.
Madisonians blamed interference with federal treaties, whereas the
Hamiltonians argued the federal military was too weak to overawe the
“savages.”
Both accounts resulted in constitutional remedies. More important
than the Indian Commerce Clause, new provisions secured by the
Madisonians declared federal treaties supreme law, barred state
treatymaking, and provided exclusive federal power over western
territories. But expansionist states won concessions guaranteeing
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federal protection and western land claims, while other provisions
created a fiscal-military state committed to western expansion.
The two narratives fared differently during ratification. While few
embraced centralization, many Federalists repeatedly invoked
“savages” to justify a stronger federal state and a standing army. This
argument swayed Georgia, which ratified to secure federal aid in its
ongoing war with the Creek Indians. But it also elevated the
dispossession of Natives into a constitutional principle. The Article
concludes by exploring this history’s interpretive implications. It
suggests the Indian affairs context unsettles conventional
understandings of the Constitution as intended to restrain the power
of the state, and challenges both originalist and progressive
assumptions about constitutional history.
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INTRODUCTION
Only two speeches at the Constitutional Convention discussed
1
Indians. On June 19, 1787, James Madison argued for expanded
federal authority, emphasizing that Georgia had “directly” violated
the Articles of Confederation when it “made war with the Indians,
2
and concluded treaties.” A day earlier, Alexander Hamilton, in a
lengthy speech arguing for a much-strengthened federal government,
listed three “important objects, which must necessarily engage the
3
attention of a national government.” “You have to protect your
rights against Canada on the north, Spain on the south, and your
4
western frontier against the savages,” he warned.
The text the Convention produced also mentioned Indians twice:
once to exclude “Indians not taxed” from the apportionment of

1. A note on terminology: I use the words “Indian” and “Native” interchangeably to
describe the indigenous peoples of North America. I also use the terms “tribe” and “nation” to
describe Native polities of the late eighteenth century. Native political organization was diverse
and complex, and Anglo-American abstractions often fit poorly onto “a world of villages, bands,
and clans.” COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY: CRISIS
AND DIVERSITY IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 8–9 (1995); see RICHARD WHITE, THE
MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–
1815, at 1–49 (1991). But I nonetheless use these terms both because they correspond with how
Anglo-Americans viewed Natives at the time and because long-standing Native interaction with
Europeans had helped construct Native nations that were more than simply European
inventions. CALLOWAY, supra, at 8–9. See generally STEVEN C. HAHN, THE INVENTION OF THE
CREEK NATION, 1670–1763 (2004) (describing the historical construction of concepts of Creek
nationhood). When possible and clear, I use the term “Anglo-American” to refer to the nonNative inhabitants of the United States, even though many were not English; as Daniel Richter
has observed, the fact that “in the new nation Whites were the ones entitled to be called
‘Americans’” rejected earlier practice and implicitly erased the continent’s Native past. DANIEL
K. RICHTER, FACING EAST FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: A NATIVE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICA
2–3, 252 (2003). Finally, I use the terms “national government” and “federal government”
interchangeably to describe the government created by the Articles and, later, the Constitution.
This is consistent with historical usage, although these terms were not uncontested, and early
Americans most frequently used the now archaic-sounding “general government.” For instances
of these usages, see infra notes 3, 324, 336, 422, 426, 447, 470 and accompanying text.
2. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 326 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
3. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 198 (Harold Coffin Syrett ed., 1961).
Hamilton’s speech, which proposed an elective monarch who would serve for life, had little
subsequent impact on the Convention; the delegates described it “praised by every body” but
“supported by none.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2,
at 363; see also RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230–35 (2004) (describing Hamilton’s
speech as one of the “flagrant errors” of Hamilton’s career).
4. 4 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 198.
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representation in the House of Representatives, and once to grant
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
6
7
Tribes.” Neither provision occasioned any recorded debate.
Histories of the Constitution, even very recent ones, assume this
absence reflects Indians’ irrelevance, and so almost entirely omit
8
Natives.
This Article reexamines this history and contends that debates
over Indians played an important role in the Constitution’s creation,
drafting, and ratification, particularly in the push for a stronger
federal state. It situates Madison and Hamilton’s speeches at the
Convention as exemplars of two contrasting strains of constitutional
thinking about relations between Indians, the national government,
and the states—one that stressed paternalism, the other that
embraced militarism. And it argues that the conquest and
dispossession of Native peoples were integral to the Constitution’s
ratification, shaping subsequent events.
Current scholarship offers two accounts of Indians and the
Constitution. Some have advanced the unpersuasive claim that the
Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy served as a primary model
9
for American federalism. But most writing on the topic has focused
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Fourteenth Amendment repeats this language in its
repeal of the Three-Fifths Clause. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
6. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. For instance, a comprehensive recent narrative history of the Convention contains no
index entries for either Indians or Native Americans—although it does contain eight entries for
the “Indian Queen,” the tavern where many delegates stayed. RICHARD R. BEEMAN, PLAIN,
HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 503 (2009). The most recent
work on ratification mentions Indians five times in the course of a nearly five hundred page
narrative. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788, at 570 (2010). Professor Akhil Amar’s “biography” of the Constitution contains brief and
scattered references to Indians, primarily in the context of western expansion, the Commerce
Clause, and Fourteenth Amendment debates over citizenship. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107–08, 270–72, 430, 439 (2005). For arguments that Indians
were largely absent from constitutional history, see DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING
EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC
WORLD, 1664–1830, at 217 (2005); DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED GENTLEMEN & WHITE
SAVAGES: INDIANS, FEDERALISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER ON THE AMERICAN
FRONTIER 93 (2008); 1 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A
COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 363–65 (2005).
9. For works advancing this claim, see DONALD A. GRINDE, JR. & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN,
EXEMPLAR OF LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY (1991);
Robert J. Miller, American Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and Its Framers,
18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133 (1993); Gregory Schaaf, From the Great Law of Peace to the
Constitution of the United States: A Revision of America’s Democratic Roots, 14 AM. INDIAN L.
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on legal doctrine, particularly the interpretation of the Indian
Commerce Clause and the legitimacy of federal plenary power over
10
Indians. This approach, while important, banishes the topic to the
specialized field of federal Indian law, reflecting the dominant
twenty-first-century perspective of Indian relations as a minor and
11
technical area of governance. Projecting this view backward onto the
Constitution’s drafting makes the absence of Indians from
constitutional history seem unsurprising.
But in the eighteenth century, Indians were not a political
afterthought. When the Constitution was written, powerful Native
nations owned and governed much of the territory mapmakers

REV. 323 (1989). For works critical of the “Iroquois Influence” hypothesis, see Erik M. Jensen,
The Imaginary Connection Between the Great Law of Peace and the United States Constitution:
A Reply to Professor Schaaf, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 25 (1991); Elisabeth Tooker, The United
States Constitution and the Iroquois League, 35 ETHNOHISTORY 305 (1988); Gordon S. Wood,
Federalism from the Bottom Up, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 705–06 (2011) (book review). An entire
forum in the William and Mary Quarterly was devoted to this question, with two critiques of the
evidence, followed by a rebuttal by Professors Donald Grinde and Bruce Johansen. See Philip
A. Levy, Exemplars of Taking Liberties: The Iroquois Influence Thesis and the Problem of
Evidence, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 588 (1996); Samuel B. Payne, Jr., The Iroquois League, the
Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 605 (1996); Donald A.
Grinde, Jr. & Bruce E. Johansen, Sauce for the Goose: Demand and Definitions for “Proof”
Regarding the Iroquois and Democracy, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 621 (1996). In my view, the critics
come out the stronger in this exchange: Professors Philip Levy and Samuel Payne convincingly
demonstrate that Grinde and Johansen present partial, distorted, and misleading readings of the
historical evidence.
10. For works in this vein, see VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES,
TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (1999); EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE:
DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Oren R. Lyons & John C.
Mohawk eds., 1992); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES,
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009); Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27
CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 510 (2007); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of
Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153 (2008); Miller, supra note 9; Robert G. Natelson, The
Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007); Nell
Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195 (1984); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069
(2004); Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 62 (1991).
11. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993) (describing the
widespread view of Indian relations as “a tiny backwater of law inhabited by impenetrably
complex and dull issues”). Professor Philip Frickey also cites purported comments from
Supreme Court Justices describing Indian law cases as “peewee” and “chickenshit.” Id. (quoting
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 58,
359 (1979)).

ABLAVSKY IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1004

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/27/2014 10:45 AM

[Vol. 63:999

12

labeled “United States.” Indians had shaped Anglo-American
13
identity and politics for over two hundred years. Concerns over
“Indian affairs”—a catch-all analog of “foreign affairs” that
encompassed treatymaking, land title, trade, and war and peace with
Native nations—drove Anglo-Americans’ earliest efforts toward
14
15
confederation and helped instigate the American Revolution.
Relations with Indians consumed much of day-to-day federal
12. The Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution transferred all British territory
east of the Mississippi River to the United States, yet only the land along the eastern seaboard
had been purchased from the Indians. In 1787, nearly all territory west of the Appalachians
(except portions of present-day Kentucky and eastern Tennessee) remained Indian country,
both de facto and de jure. See REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY, 1783–1812, at 4–15 (1967); see also infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., COLIN G. CALLOWAY, NEW WORLDS FOR ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND
THE REMAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 196 (1997) (“[T]he Indian presence in America’s past
profoundly shaped the ways in which early American history unfolded. Europeans had to take
account of Indians in their wars, diplomacy, and daily lives. They lived alongside Indians and
had to know something about them.”); JILL LEPORE, THE NAME OF WAR: KING PHILIP’S WAR
AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY (1998) (emphasizing how struggles against the
Indians in seventeenth-century New England helped create an American identity); RICHTER,
supra note 1, at 252 (stressing that the United States “was born in a revolution against Indians as
well as against the crown, that its prosperity was based on the expropriation of Native land,
[and] that its participatory politics rested on racial exclusion”); PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE
NEIGHBORS: HOW INDIAN WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA xviii (2008) (describing how
Indian wars in the mid-Atlantic helped produce “a democratic revolution and the dignifying of
ordinary people; a commitment to toleration, or at least a deep hostility to bigotry between
Europeans; and, in time, most of the American republic’s institutional beginnings”). See
generally CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, THIS VIOLENT EMPIRE: THE BIRTH OF AN
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 191–287 (2010) (relating how portrayals of Natives were
“[e]ssential to the production of an American national identity”).
14. See The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of New England—1643–
1684, in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 77, 77–81 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)
(establishing an agreement between the New England colonies “for offence and defence,
mutual advice and succor” because “the natives have formerly committed sundry insolence and
outrages upon several Plantations of the English and have of late combined themselves against
us”); Plan of a Proposd Union of the Several Colonies of Masachusets-bay, New Hampshire,
Coneticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jerseys, Pensilvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, and South Carolina, For their Mutual Defence and Security, and for Extending the
British Settlements in North America (July 10, 1754), in 5 PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
387, 387–92 (Leonard W. Labaree & Whitfield J. Bell, Jr. eds., 1962) [hereinafter Albany Plan
of Union] (proposing a colonial union to “hold or direct all Indian treaties” and “make all
purchases . . . from Indians for the crown”); see also TIMOTHY J. SHANNON, INDIANS AND
COLONISTS AT THE CROSSROADS OF EMPIRE: THE ALBANY CONGRESS OF 1754 (2000)
(describing the creation of the Albany Plan of Union in the context of Indian diplomacy).
15. WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 5–40 (1999); RICHTER, supra note 1, at
216–20.
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governance under both the Articles and the new Constitution, and
17
provoked some of the nation’s earliest constitutional crises. In the
Constitution’s historical context, then, the apparent absence of
Indians is a striking anomaly. It is also, this Article contends, wrong.
Part of the problem is that Indians were inseparable from other
critical constitutional issues. As Hamilton’s Convention speech
highlights, Indian affairs quickly implicated foreign relations: the
Constitution’s drafters feared Indians would ally with the British and
Spanish in the contest for continental control. The question of Indians
also lurked behind the recurrent and fraught issues of western land,
territory, and statehood. Historians have focused on these aspects of
the Constitution but made Indians peripheral, touching on them only
18
in passing. This Article reverses this presumption and emphasizes
Indian affairs, discussing other aspects when relevant.
16. See, e.g., BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF
NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 11, 197–200, 205–11 (2009)
(“Relations with Indians for much of the nineteenth century demonstrated the integral
connection between the federal government, national security, territorial expansion, and the
economy.”); STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 2 (2010) (“[I]n each major era of Indian policy, and in each region
into which the United States moved, ‘the Indian question’ existed near the center of concerns
about the nation’s future. Indian affairs were absolutely critical to virtually all calculations of
interest, of politics, of economy, of social situation, and of national survival and future
development.”); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 123–32 (2009) (“Nothing preoccupied the Federalist [Washington]
administration more than having to deal with . . . native peoples.”).
17. Numerous constitutional conflicts arose from Indian affairs. One such conflict was the
Yazoo land fraud. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); C. PETER MAGRATH,
YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966).
Another involved questions of state sovereign immunity. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 378 (1798). And Indian removal occasioned one of the most significant constitutional
confrontations in the antebellum United States. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832); see also LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836, at 108–20 (2010) (“[T]he new federal constitution
lodged Indian diplomacy and Indian land rights at the center of contests over state’s rights.”).
See generally JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND
POLITICS (1996); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment,
53 DUKE L.J. 875 (2003) (arguing for the influence of Worcester on the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
18. A number of recent works have emphasized the international context for the
Constitution. See generally, e.g., ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE (2012); DAVID C.
HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2003); David
M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the
Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010).
There have been fewer works on the question of western expansion and the Constitution. The
foundational work remains PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC:
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To appreciate the influence of Indian affairs on the Constitution,
we must begin with the Articles. After the Revolution, national
Indian policy was both vital and disastrous. The impoverished
Continental Congress desperately needed both peace with Indians
and western land to retire its debt. It got neither. Instead, by 1787, it
confronted two looming wars it could not afford against powerful
Native confederacies.
Nationalists such as Madison and Hamilton agreed on the
problem: Congress was too weak to exercise the authority it enjoyed
on paper. Indian affairs thus propelled the creation of a more
powerful national state—one that, in Madison’s words, would possess
19
the “ability to effect what it is proper [it] should do.” The new
government, its proponents hoped, would have the power to govern
not merely in principle but “in reality,” as Secretary at War Henry
20
Knox wrote about Indian affairs.
A strengthened federal state, however, did not mean the same
thing to all the Constitution’s proponents. As his comments at the
Convention suggest, Madison, the delegate most interested in Indian
21
relations, blamed the disasters of national Indian policy on state
intrusions on national authority, particularly the treatymaking
22
23
power. The Madisonian constitutional solution for Indian affairs
JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775–1787 (1983). One important
work that places Indians in the context of foreign diplomacy during the era of the Constitution’s
creation is LEONARD J. SADOSKY, REVOLUTIONARY NEGOTIATIONS: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND
DIPLOMATS IN THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA (2009).
19. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 18 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 24, 28 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1995).
20. Report of the Secretary of War on the Southern Indians (July 18, 1787), in 18 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607–1789: REVOLUTION AND
CONFEDERATION 449, 450 (Alden T. Vaughan gen. ed., Colin G. Calloway ed., 1994)
[hereinafter EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS]. Knox’s position was labeled as
“Secretary at War” under the Articles. See 19 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789,
at 126 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1912) (establishing under the Articles of
Confederation the position of “Secretary at War”). He was appointed to the new position of
“Secretary of War” in September 1789. See HARRY M. WARD, THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR,
1781–1795, at 101–02 (1962); see also Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (establishing the
Department of War and the office of Secretary of War, a position invested with “such duties as
shall be enjoined on, or entrusted to him by the President of the United States . . . relative to
Indian Affairs”).
21. See Jacob T. Levy, Indians in Madison’s Constitutional Order, in JAMES MADISON AND
THE FUTURE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT 121, 121–25 (John Samples ed., 2002).
22. This concern over state excesses under the Articles characterized much of Madison’s
thinking at the time of the Constitution’s drafting. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for
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accordingly recrafted federalism to ensure federal supremacy—partly
through the Indian Commerce Clause, but more significantly through
the Treaty, Compact, Supremacy, and Property Clauses. The
Madisonian approach, briefly summarized, was paternalist: it
envisioned a strengthened federal government that would protect and
restrain Indians and states alike.
The Hamiltonian take was different. Hamilton had little interest
in Indian affairs, but his concern over external threats dovetailed with
the views of many on the frontier, who blamed the Articles’ failure on
national military weakness against Native power. The “savages”
Hamilton referenced at the Convention were thus both impetus and
justification for the creation of a federal standing army supported
through direct taxation. This militarist constitutional solution to
Indian affairs sought a fiscal-military state that would possess the
24
means to dominate the borderlands at Indians’ expense.
Little discussed at the Convention, these two constitutional
solutions to the challenges of Indian affairs appeared more fully in
the ratification debates, where they suffered divergent fates. While
Madison’s argument for centralization languished, Hamiltonian
invocation of the “savage” threat, embraced partly out of expediency,
became an important part of Federalist rhetoric. And it worked to
great effect, securing the ratification of an otherwise skeptical
Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451,
462–63 (2010); see also CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES:
THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2005); infra notes 202–203 and
accompanying text.
23. I have borrowed the distinction between the Madisonian and other Federalist views on
the Constitution from Professor Max Edling. See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR
OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
STATE 3–11 (2003). I apply the labels “Madisonian” and “Hamiltonian” to these two
perspectives on Indian affairs to reflect their respective roles in propounding these views both at
the Convention and in The Federalist. But, although the two views diverged, they were not
mutually exclusive; Madison and Hamilton, as well as many other nationalists, embraced
elements of both perspectives at various points.
24. I also borrow the term “fiscal-military state” from Edling, who adopts it from the
historical literature on British state formation, in which the term refers to “a state primarily
designed for war.” EDLING, supra note 23, at 47–49. As Edling argues, the United States did not
adopt the British model wholesale; instead, the Constitution created a national government that
was “light, and inconspicuous,” but which “held the full powers of the ‘fiscal-military state’ in
reserve.” Id. at 47, 227. Historians use the term “borderlands” to describe “the contested
boundaries between colonial domains,” where sovereignty and authority were ill-defined and
uneven. Jeremy Adelman & Stephen Aron, From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, NationStates, and the Peoples in Between in North American History, 104 AM. HIST. REV. 814, 816
(1999); Pekka Hämäläinen & Samuel Truett, On Borderlands, 98 J. AM. HIST. 338, 351–61
(2011).
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Georgia anxious for federal military aid. Had Georgia failed to ratify,
the Constitution’s eventual success would have been much more
tenuous.
But using Indians to justify the power of the new national state
came with a cost: it elevated conquest of Indians to a constitutional
principle. Although few Federalists were rabid Indian-haters of the
25
sort common on the frontier, they had sold the Constitution by
promising to use federal power against Indians rather than, as
Madison had anticipated, to restrain states. Expansionist states and
white settlers held the federal government to its bargain. The history
of national violence against Indians that followed ratification fulfilled
the Hamiltonian vision, as the dispossession and settlement of
western lands became one of the central projects of the new federal
state.
The historical narrative presented by this Article underscores the
importance of Indian affairs in creating the Constitution, particularly
provisions concerning federalism and the fiscal-military state, and
highlights how ratification created a document intended to conquer
Indians. In addition to revising historical understandings of the
Constitution, this account has theoretical and normative implications,
but these depend on one’s perspective. From an originalist
standpoint, it recounts how multiple and even divergent intents
among the Constitution’s drafters became, through ratification,
something akin to the document’s “original public meaning.” From
the perspective of popular constitutionalism, the “people themselves”
ultimately determined what the Constitution would mean for Indian
26
affairs. In short, both the Constitution’s drafters and “the people”
worked to create a document committed in part to the violent
expropriation of the western borderlands from Indians. This outcome
was not a failure of the political process. It was, rather, the cost of the
Constitution’s embrace of democracy and union.
To support these interpretive insights, this Article is divided into
four parts. Part I recounts the failure of national Indian policy under
the Articles, and reviews the nationalists’ explanations for this failure
in the weaknesses of the federal state. Part II describes how
provisions of the Constitution offered potential solutions for these
difficulties. Part III explores ratification debates over Indian affairs,
25. See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
26. On popular constitutionalism, see generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
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and demonstrates how the Hamiltonian emphasis on national military
power proved critical in securing ratification, but also solidified the
document’s subsequent meaning. Finally, Part IV explores some of
the implications of this history for interpreting the Constitution,
including considering the document’s commitment to dispossessing
Natives alongside its entrenchment of chattel slavery.
I. THE ARTICLES’ FAILURES
In 1783, the newly created “citizens of America” were
27
optimistic. Victory in the Revolution had rendered the nation, in
George Washington’s words, “the sole Lords and Proprietors of a
28
vast tract of continent.” Four years later, hope had turned to
despondence, as the Continental Congress, with an empty treasury
and a barely extant military, confronted looming wars against
powerful Indian confederacies on the northern and southern
borderlands.
This Part explores the causes and meaning of this failure. Part
I.A details the struggles over state and national authority over Indian
affairs in drafting the Articles. Part I.B recounts the creation of
national Indian policy from 1783 to 1784. Part I.C traces the failure of
that policy in complex negotiations on the northern and southern
borderlands, where the national government proved unable to
constrain states, squatters, or Indians. Part I.D considers the lessons
nationalists drew from these failures. Though the Madisonians and
Hamiltonians agreed on the need for a strengthened national state,
they diverged in their explanations: Madisonians focused on the
national inability to control states, whereas Hamiltonians fixed on the
military weaknesses that made the country unable to counter Native
power.
A. Drafting the Articles
Indian affairs mattered in early America because Natives were
ubiquitous. Although their numbers had declined significantly since
contact with Europeans, as many as 150,000 Indians lived in the trans-

27. GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE LAST OFFICIAL ADDRESS, OF HIS EXCELLENCY
GENERAL WASHINGTON, TO THE LEGISLATURES OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (Hartford, Hudson
& Goodwin 1783).
28. Id.
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29

Appalachian West in 1783. The population of the United States was
much larger—3.9 million by the time of the 1790 census—but heavily
30
concentrated along the coast between New England and Virginia.
Further west and south, Anglo-American settlement, although
31
rapidly growing, remained sparse and scattered.
Trade with Native nations also remained important. AngloAmerican traders competed with the British and Spanish for the
32
Native-controlled deerskin and fur trades, but trade was even more
vital for securing cross-cultural alliances: as George Washington
stated, “[T]he trade of the Indians is a main mean of their political
33
management.” Natives’ most important economic resource, though,
was land. Gripped by what one scholar has dubbed “the great land
34
rush,” Anglo-Americans speculated wildly in western lands. Land
29. Determining historical Native population numbers is difficult and imprecise. For an
estimate of 150,000, see James H. Merrell, Declarations of Independence: Indian-White Relations
in the New Nation, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 197, 201
(Jack P. Greene ed., 1987); for an estimate of 100,000, see WOOD, supra note 16, at 123; Letter
from Col. Arthur Campbell to Gov. Randolph (Dec. 5, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA
STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS FROM JAN. 1, 1785, TO JULY 2, 1789, PRESERVED IN
THE CAPITOL AT RICHMOND 363, 364 (William P. Palmer ed., Richmond, Rush U. Derr 1884)
[hereinafter CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS] (projecting a population of 100,000 for
the Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws combined). For additional background on
Native demographics, see generally 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT ch. Ag (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., millennial ed. 2006);
RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: POPULATION
HISTORY SINCE 1492, at 60–90 (1987); Edward Countryman, Indians, the Colonial Order, and
the Social Significance of the American Revolution, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 342, 347–48 (1996).
30. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 1-26 tbl.Aa1–5. The population density is
best understood visually. See 1790 Population Map, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.
gov/history/www/reference/maps/1790_population_map.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
31. The 1790 census recorded roughly 82,500 inhabitants in Georgia and 73,500 inhabitants
in Kentucky—then part of Virginia and one of the only areas settled by Anglo-Americans west
of the Appalachians. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 1-244 tbl.Aa3644-3744, 1-217
tbl.Aa3097-3197. Given the very rapid growth rate of Georgia and Kentucky during this period,
the states’ populations during the 1780s would have been considerably smaller. Note that Native
American populations were not recorded in the census, and, although I refer to AngloAmerican settlement, both Georgia and Kentucky contained large numbers of enslaved
Africans. See id. (recording 29,662 and 12,544 black inhabitants in Georgia and Kentucky,
respectively).
32. KATHRYN E. HOLLAND BRAUND, DEERSKINS AND DUFFELS: THE CREEK INDIAN
TRADE WITH ANGLO-AMERICA, 1685–1815, at 164–88 (1993); WHITE, supra note 1, at 476–85.
33. Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate (Aug. 4, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 188, 189 (Mark A. Mastromarino et al. eds.,
1996).
34. JOHN C. WEAVER, THE GREAT LAND RUSH AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
WORLD, 1650–1900, at 96–116 (2003); see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN
IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 249–51 (1990).
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companies mushroomed, buying and selling dubious claims to vast
tracts of Native territory while drawing heavy investment from the
35
new nation’s political elite. Indians, in short, possessed the most
36
valuable commodity in early America.
Given the interests at stake, properly governing Indian affairs
was critical. Yet the United States had inherited a divided legacy from
the British Empire. On the one hand, individual colonies had long
37
made treaties and regulated trade with tribes. On the other hand,
imperial officials, frustrated by colonies’ uncoordinated actions,
38
fitfully sought to impose a centralized regime. These efforts became
more serious after 1754, when the Albany Congress proposed a “Plan
of Union” among the colonies that included a grand council with
39
powers over Indian affairs, the military, and western settlement. This
Plan failed, but it signaled further centralizing reforms: the creation of
two imperial superintendents responsible for managing relations with
40
tribes, the assertion of Britain’s sole right of preemption of Indian
41
lands, and, in the Proclamation of 1763, a settlement boundary
42
reserving territory west of the Appalachian crest for Indian nations.
These reforms angered colonists, who resented imperial interference
in lucrative land speculations; they simply flouted the Proclamation
43
and similar restrictions.

35. On the rise of the land companies, see STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST
THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 104–21 (2005); PATRICK GRIFFIN,
AMERICAN LEVIATHAN: EMPIRE, NATION, AND REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER 46–71 (2007);
HOLTON, supra note 15, at 3–38. See generally ALFRED P. JAMES, THE OHIO COMPANY: ITS
INNER HISTORY (1959).
36. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 29, at 357–60.
37. See generally 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20 (recording the
diplomatic and legal relations of individual states with Indians).
38. Clinton, supra note 10, at 1066–79.
39. Albany Plan of Union, supra note 14, at 387–92. See generally SHANNON, supra note 14
(providing background on the Albany Congress and the Plan of Union)
40. See generally DANIEL K RICHTER, The Plan of 1764: Native Americans and the British
Empire That Never Was, in TRADE, LAND, POWER: THE STRUGGLE FOR EASTERN NORTH
AMERICA 177 (2013); John R. Alden, The Albany Congress and the Creation of the Indian
Superintendencies, 27 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 193 (1940).
41. BANNER, supra note 35, at 104–05.
42. COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN: 1763 AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NORTH AMERICA 92–98 (2006); Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude
to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 329, 354–56 (1989).
43. See BANNER, supra note 35, at 98–104 (noting the prevalence of illegal settlement and
purchase of lands guaranteed to the Indians by the Proclamation); HOLTON, supra note 15, at 30
(“The Proclamation of 1763 was anathema to every Virginia land speculator . . . .”).
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After independence, centralized governance and its challenges
became the responsibility of the Continental Congress. The first
drafts of a plan for the new government largely recapitulated imperial
Indian policy: no colony could engage in offensive war against
Natives without congressional consent; the United States would enter
into an alliance with the Six Nations; and the Continental Congress
would retain the right of preemption of all Native land while
44
guaranteeing Indian title to unpurchased territory. But these
45
provisions largely evaporated in subsequent drafts.
The most contentious remaining provision was the proposal in
the Articles’ second draft that Congress be granted “sole and
exclusive right and power of . . . Regulating the Trade, and managing
46
all Affairs with the Indians.” Most delegates supported this
47
addition. James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued that “[n]o lasting
peace will be [made] with the Indians, unless made by some one
body,” and insisted that the United States should have the sole power
48
to make treaties with the Indians. But Virginia’s delegates wanted
authority over Indians within state borders, and the South Carolina
delegation “very passionately” opposed the measure, stressing the
49
importance of its Indian trade. The next draft compromised,
granting the national government “sole and exclusive” power only
50
over affairs with Indians “not members of any of the States.” Some
evidently thought this was inadequate; a year later Congress added

44. See 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 195–98
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905).
45. See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 679–89
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906). The exclusive war power remained, but was qualified
in the event a state faced imminent Indian attack. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781,
art. VI, para. 5 (“No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in
Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received
certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and
the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled
can be consulted . . . .”).
46. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 45, at 681–82.
47. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 1077–79 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906). Delegates from Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Georgia, and Maryland
spoke in favor of the provision, while delegates from Virginia conditionally endorsed it; only
delegates from South Carolina were strongly opposed.
48. Id. at 1078–79 (alteration in original).
49. Id.
50. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 45, at 681–82.
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language further protecting states’ rights. As finally ratified, Article
IX of the Articles granted Congress the “sole and exclusive right and
power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the
legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
52
violated.”
This compromise undoubtedly deserved James Madison’s later
53
criticism as “obscure and contradictory.” But its inconsistencies were
not a product of infelicitous drafting. Article IX attempted to
reconcile centralized authority over Indian affairs with the competing
legacy of state preeminence, an impulse heightened by hostility to
earlier imperial policy. States with sufficient clout to write qualifying
language into the Articles would not acquiesce to congressional
supremacy, no matter how phrased. As delegate Thomas Stone of
Maryland put it during the debates over Article IX, “What is the
meaning of this superintendency [over Indian affairs]? Colonies will
claim the right first. . . . Disputes will arise when Congress shall
54
interpose.” Subsequent events proved Stone’s prescience.
B. The Creation of Congressional Indian Policy
The Revolution bequeathed another legacy to the United States:
Indian hating. Deeply divided Native nations had sought to maintain
neutrality during the war, but factions from many tribes sided with
the British. The result was brutal and chaotic violence. AngloAmericans—long accustomed to viewing Natives, in the words of the
Declaration of Independence, as “merciless Indian Savages, whose
known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished Destruction, of all
55
Ages, Sexes and Conditions” —pillaged Indian country, ravaging
56
Native villages. As attitudes toward Indians hardened, frontier
51. See 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 844–45
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1907) (adding “provided, that the legislative right of any
State, within its own limits be not infringed or violated” to the congressional power over Indian
affairs).
52. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4.
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
54. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 47, at 1079.
55. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776); see also John R. Wunder,
“Merciless Indian Savages” and the Declaration of Independence: Native Americans Translate the
Ecunnaunuxulgee Document, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65, 65–73 (2000) (discussing Indians’
likely responses to the Declaration of Independence).
56. For background on the fierce struggles between Anglo-American colonists and Native
nations during the Revolution, and the virulent hatred of Indians this fighting engendered
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settlers increasingly spoke of “extirpating” Natives. “The Country
taulks of Nothing but killing Indians, & taking posession of thier
58
lands,” reported one visitor to western Pennsylvania. The full depths
of frontier fury against Indians were revealed in 1782, when
Pennsylvania militia indiscriminately slaughtered nearly one hundred
pacifist Christianized Natives upon suspicion they had aided attacks
59
by British-allied Indians.
The year after the butchery known as the Gnadenhütten
massacre, the United States reached a peace agreement with Great
Britain. The resulting Treaty of Paris of 1783 acknowledged
American independence and ceded the nation all British territory
east of the Mississippi River, a tremendous swath far larger than
60
existing Anglo-American settlements. But Native nations, excluded
from the treaty and still at war with the United States, owned this
61
land. Indian affairs and western expansion were thus intimately
intertwined: as George Washington wrote, “[T]he settlem[en]t of the
Western Country, and making a Peace with the Indians, are so
analogous, that there can be no definition of the one, without
62
involving considerations of the other.”
The peace that the congressional Committee on Indian Affairs
proposed reflected the anger against Indians born of years of
violence. According to the Committee’s report, the Indians were the
“aggressors in the war, without even a pretence of provocation,” and
had “wantonly desolated our villages and settlements, and destroyed

among white settlers, see CALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 25–31, 292–301; RICHTER, supra note 1,
at 218–23; SILVER, supra note 13, at 230–92.
57. See, e.g., CALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 132–33, 292–301 (quoting a Seneca leader’s
statement that the Americans “wish for nothing more, than to extirpate us from the Earth, that
they may possess our Lands”); SILVER, supra note 13, at 263–83 (noting the prevalence of the
“language of exterminatory anti-Indianism” during and after the Revolution, and citing several
instances when Anglo-Americans demanded Indians’ “extirpation”); Merrell, supra note 29, at
199 (reporting one English visitor’s comment that “[t]he white American have the most
rancorous antipathy to the whole race of Indians and nothing is more common than to hear
them talk of extirpating them from the face of the earth, men, women, and children”).
58. SILVER, supra note 13, at 276.
59. Id. at 267–76; Rob Harper, Looking the Other Way: The Gnadenhutten Massacre and
the Contextual Interpretation of Violence, 64 WM. & MARY Q. 621 (2007).
60. Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 2, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 81–82.
61. CALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 275–91.
62. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in 10 THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 303, 311 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., N.Y., G.P. Putnam’s
Sons 1891).
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our citizens.” Now purportedly conquered, Native nations should
“make atonement for . . . their wanton barbarity” with the only means
65
available to them: their land. The United States, the Committee
urged, should hold treaty sessions with the hostile tribes, forgo the
long-standing diplomatic custom of purchasing Native title, and
inform the Indians that “Great Britain has . . . relinquished to the
66
United States all claim to the country.” Then the United States
should take nearly all of present-day Ohio, none of which had been
67
previously purchased.
The Committee’s bluster concealed Congress’s fundamental
weakness. Congress had to claim Indian land by conquest because it
68
lacked the funds to purchase it. An empty purse also meant the
United States desired peace as much as the Indians did: the country
could not afford to keep fighting, which, the Committee
69
acknowledged, would be both expensive and ineffective. The
national government needed western land still more desperately. The
country was saddled with an enormous war debt, and, with few
sources of revenue available, many congressional delegates viewed
70
western lands as “[t]he only adequate fund” for repayment.

63. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 683 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1922).
64. See Letter from the Pennsylvania Delegates to the Pennsylvania Assembly (Sept. 25,
1783), in 20 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 710, 710 (Paul H. Smith ed.,
1993) (“It is intended to insist as Part of the Terms of Peace that the Savages should without
Compensation abandon Part of their Country to the United States who claim it by Conquest &
as a Retribution for the Expence & Damages incurred by the hostile & cruel Conduct of the
Savages contrary to the Advice & Injunctions of the United States.”).
65. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 683–94.
66. Id. at 684; see also SILVER, supra note 13, at 288–89 (describing the Committee on
Indian Affairs report in the context of revolutionary-era anti-Indian rhetoric).
67. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 686.
68. See id. at 682 (“[T]he public finances do not admit of any considerable expenditure to
extinguish the Indian claims upon such [western] lands.”).
69. Id.
70. Letter from Arthur Lee to John Adams (May 11, 1784), in 21 LETTERS OF DELEGATES
TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 607, 607–08 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1994); see Letter from William
Ellery to Francis Dana (Dec. 3, 1783), in 21 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789,
supra, at 173, 177 (noting that the value of a land cession may be “sufficient to discharge our
whole public debt”); Letter from David Howell to Jabez Bown (Mar. 23, 1784), in 21 LETTERS
OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra, at 453, 454 (“The Western Country is
considered by the present Congress as a capital resource for the payment of our debts—the
more it is explored the more it rises in our estimation.”).
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Congress had already begun granting as-yet unceded land to veterans
71
of the Continental Army that Congress was too poor to pay.
But the United States was not the only claimant of lands Indians
owned. Many states inherited colonial charters that purportedly
72
extended their boundaries to the Pacific. These vague grants
73
frequently overlapped, leading to internecine jurisdictional conflicts.
Some states in turn sold these expansive but nominal claims to
74
competing speculators; other states used the land to pay their own
75
revolutionary veterans. Congress ostensibly had the power under the
Articles to reconcile these interests through a convoluted quasi76
77
judicial process, yet it rarely exercised this role. Congress instead
urged states to cede their claims to the national government, but such
suasion often went unheeded, as states zealously pursued self78
interest.
State competition made the work of the Committee on Indian
Affairs, in the words of one delegate, a “delicate Business,” since any
79
resolution would affect state claims. Even the selection of
congressional commissioners to negotiate the proposed treaties
erupted into a fierce struggle between Massachusetts, New York,
Maryland, and Rhode Island, which congressional president Charles
Thomson likened to “the fable of the hunters quarreling about the
80
bear skin, before they had killed the bear.” “The whole scene,” he
wrote, “was to me another strong symptom of the approaching

71. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 681–94.
72. ONUF, supra note 18, at 3–20.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Peter Onuf, Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands,
34 WM. & MARY Q. 353, 370–73 (1977) (describing the struggles over various company claims to
western lands).
75. See, e.g., J. David Lehman, The End of the Iroquois Mystique: The Oneida Land
Cession Treaties of the 1780s, 47 WM. & MARY Q. 523, 533 (1990) (describing New York’s policy
of granting Indian territory as bounty lands).
76. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 2.
77. See ONUF, supra note 18, at 19–20 (noting the cumbersome nature of Article IX and
stressing that “Congress’s record as an active agent in interstate conflict resolution was not
distinguished”).
78. See Onuf, supra note 74, at 369–71 (describing states’ resistance of congressional calls
for cession).
79. Letter from Samuel Osgood to John Adams (Jan. 14, 1784), in 21 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 70, at 276, 278.
80. Letter from Charles Thomson to Hannah Thomson (Oct. 21, 1783), in 21 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 70, at 86, 87.
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dissolution of the Union.” The Committee had no desire to entangle
itself in these disputes; it ducked the entire question by resolving that
its actions “shall not be construed to affect the territorial claims of
82
any of the states, or their legislative rights within their limits.” These
concessions did not alter congressional policy, but would, the
Committee hoped, placate the states.
Western land hunger had also infected swarms of Anglo83
American settlers. They cared little for jurisdictional niceties and
84
squatted on lands regardless of formal title. Their hatred of Indians,
born of wartime suffering, led them to reject Native land ownership,
and so they had no compunction occupying territory guaranteed to
85
Indian nations under successive treaties.
86
Policymakers disdained these squatters as “Lawless Banditti,”
and feared that their influx would create “fresh discontent and
87
hostilities” among the Indians, resulting in “a great deal of
88
bloodshed.” The Committee on Indian Affairs urged that
congressional commissioners “signify to them the displeasure of
89
Congress.” Citing Article IX, Congress subsequently prohibited all
settlement on Indian land and required congressional approval for all
90
sales outside state territory.
In short, as the Committee on Indian Affairs’ report reveals, any
consideration of Indian affairs implicated a labyrinth of competing
interests: the Committee had to make peace with Natives, restrain
illegal settlement, and conciliate state assertions of sovereignty, all
with limited funds and while seizing the land necessary to repay the
91
national debt. The Committee’s proposed solutions demonstrated an

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 87–88.
25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 693.
See GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 3–16, 181–211.
Id.
Id. at 181–211. See generally SILVER, supra note 13.
Letter from James Manning to Hezekiah Smith (May 17, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 293, 294 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1995).
87. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 682.
88. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 62, at 304.
89. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 689.
90. Id. at 602.
91. Cf. Peter S. Onuf, Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of the West in the 1780s, 43
WM. & MARY Q. 179, 181 (1986) (“The challenge [facing Congress] was to regulate the
westward thrust of settlement in ways that would strengthen the union, preserve peace with the
Indians and neighboring imperial powers, and pay the public debt while permitting enterprising
settlers to pursue their own goals.”).
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extraordinary faith in the power of its formal authority to restrain
competing actors. Indians would yield their land because the Treaty
of Paris granted it to the United States. States’ jurisdictional concerns
would be mollified by reiterating the qualifying language of Article
IX. And swarms of illegal squatters would defer to congressional
proclamations of authority over Indian affairs.
As a question of law, Congress’s interpretation of its powers
92
under the Articles was persuasive. But there were few institutions to
compel compliance. Congress evidently expected that documents
could control reality. Squatter defiance, Indian independence, and
state intractability quickly shattered this illusion and revealed the
inadequacy of the federal government’s paper authority.
C. The Failure of Congressional Indian Policy
It did not take long for Congress to discover the limits of its
power. Expressions of “the displeasure of Congress,” for instance,
had little effect on Anglo-American settlers illegally squatting on
93
Indian land. When George Washington visited territory north of the
Ohio in 1784, he found the “rage” for land speculation unabated. “In
defiance of the proclamation of Congress,” he lamented,
“[speculators] roam over the Country on the Indian side of the
Ohio—mark out Lands—Survey—and even settle them. This gives
great discontent to the Indians, and will unless measures are taken in
time to prevent it, inevitably produce a war with the western
94
Tribes.” Washington proposed that Congress make illegal settlement
95
a felony “if there is power for the purpose.” Congress instead
instructed the commander of the makeshift national army, Josiah
96
Harmar, to expel the settlers. Harmar had little success. He

92. By contrast, Congress’s aggressive reading of the Treaty of Paris had considerably less
grounding in the law of the time. Its decision to reject Native title and adopt a theory of
conquest represented a dramatic break from earlier practice and legal theory, and was soon
retracted. BANNER, supra note 35, at 112–49; Merrell, supra note 29, at 200–05.
93. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text; see also 25 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 689.
94. Letter from George Washington to Jacob Read (Nov. 3, 1784), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES, 118, 119–20 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy
Twohig eds., 1992).
95. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 62, at 307.
96. See 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 472 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).
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discovered the settlers either did not know their actions were illegal,
or disagreed: one group in 1785 argued that, under the Articles,
“Congress is not empowered to forbid” their settlement and sought to
98
create their own government. Harmar repeatedly removed small
handfuls of the “immense” number of settlers, but many more
99
returned. It would be “impossible” to prevent such encroachment
100
without more forceful measures, Harmar concluded.
Harmar’s struggles mirrored difficulties elsewhere. As the
Continental Congress quickly learned, neither states nor Natives had
any more respect for Congress’s claims to authority than the unruly
squatters. Two sets of borderland negotiations—on the northwestern
and southern frontiers, respectively—underscore this point.
1. The North. Iroquoia and the Ohio Country—present-day
upstate New York and Ohio, respectively—were the most foughtover ground in eighteenth-century North America. The French and
British had battled to control the region for decades, a struggle that
101
precipitated the global conflict known as the Seven Years War. The
outcome of these imperial wars hinged on the allegiances of Native
nations, foremost among them the Six Nations, “the Fiercest and
102
most Formidable People in North America,” who had long been the
103
focus of diplomacy in Indian country.

97. See, e.g., Letter from Brigadier-Gen. Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (Aug. 7,
1787), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 26, 28 (William Henry Smith ed., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke
& Co. 1882) (describing how the posting of the congressional proclamation ordering removal
“amazed the inhabitants [of the western territories] exceedingly, particularly those who style
themselves Americans”).
98. Letter from Colonel Harmar to the President of Congress (May 1, 1785), in 2 THE ST.
CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 3, 5.
99. Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (June 1, 1785), in 2 THE ST.
CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 6, 6; see Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of
War (July 12, 1786), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 14, 14.
100. Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (June 1, 1785), supra note
99, at 6.
101. FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR AND THE FATE OF
EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754–1766, at xviii, 11–32, 36–38 (2000).
102. CADWALLADER COLDEN, THE HISTORY OF THE FIVE INDIAN NATIONS xxi (Cornell
Univ. Press ed. 1958) (1727).
103. See generally FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE: THE
COVENANT CHAIN CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN TRIBES WITH ENGLISH COLONIES FROM ITS
BEGINNINGS TO THE LANCASTER TREATY OF 1744 (1984); DANIEL K. RICHTER, THE ORDEAL
OF THE LONGHOUSE: THE PEOPLES OF THE IROQUOIS LEAGUE IN THE ERA OF EUROPEAN
COLONIZATION (1992). I use the term Iroquois rather than Haudenosaunee, which many tribe
members use, to assist nonspecialist readers. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, PEN AND INK
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The Revolution engulfed the region in war yet again. The Six
Nations had struggled to maintain neutrality, but ultimately divided—
the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, and Cayugas sided with the
British, while the Oneidas and Tuscaroras allied with the
104
Americans. The ensuing violence devastated Iroquois communities
105
on both sides.
New York, anxious to extend its jurisdiction over Iroquois lands
also claimed by Massachusetts, saw Iroquois “defeat” as an
106
To fend off potential
opportunity to obtain Indian title.
congressional interference, New Yorkers argued that the Six Nations
were members of the state within their jurisdiction, “the Management
107
of whom Congress have no concern.” The New York legislature
even considered a resolution that would have prohibited
congressional commissioners from negotiating with the Iroquois
108
without the legislature’s “express permission.” These actions led
Washington to fear the state would expel the Six Nations altogether,
109
which he predicted “will end in another Indian War.”
Washington’s anxiety stemmed from his recognition that Indians
110
“will not suffer their Country . . . to be wrested from them,” for they
111
were not the prostrate peoples Congress portrayed. The Six Nations
and other tribes did not regard themselves as conquered and refused
112
to “submit to be treated as Dependents.” They instead insisted
upon the sanctity of earlier boundary lines, leading Anglo-Americans
to lament that the tribes, instead of showing “Contrition for their
perfidious Behaviour, seem ever to consider themselves as the Party
113
courted and sollicited for Reconciliation and Favour.”
Such
WITCHCRAFT: TREATIES AND TREATY MAKING IN AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY xii (2013)
(discussing this question of terminology).
104. See BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 100–01
(1972).
105. See generally CALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 108–57; GRAYMONT, supra note 104, at 129–
56.
106. See Lehman, supra note 75, at 533.
107. James Duane’s Views on Indian Negotiations (July/Aug. 1784), in 18 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 299, 299.
108. Lehman, supra note 75, at 533.
109. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 62, at 306.
110. Id.
111. See Merrell, supra note 29, at 203 (“The Indian nations insisted that they were
sovereign, that American independence did not mean native American dependence, and the
United States was unable to make them change their minds.”).
112. Duane, supra note 107, at 299.
113. Id.
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defiance found support in the British: threatened by the Iroquois with
war if they abandoned their forts on the Great Lakes, the British
opted to violate the Treaty of Paris and remain, supplying arms and
114
tacit encouragement to Native resisters.
Washington recommended negotiation with the Six Nations for
115
the cession of only a small part of their land. Congress adopted this
116
suggestion, but New York wanted more, and discouraged any treaty
that would recognize any Iroquois title within the state. New York
Governor George Clinton told the congressional commissioners
appointed to secure the treaty that he would regard any agreement
with Indians “residing within the Jurisdiction of this State” as an
117
As outraged
infringement of New York’s sovereign rights.
congressional delegate Jacob Read reported to Washington, Clinton
then held “a treaty of [his] own Authority with the Six Nations in
defiance of our Resolves and the Clause of the Confederation
118
restricting the Individual states.” Read feared that Clinton’s action
would “be Attended with worse Consequences With respect to the
Indians than almost any other that state Cou’d take . . . . If this
119
Conduct is to be pursued our Commissioners are rendered useless.”
Read’s despair was premature. The Iroquois, aware of the
divisions between Congress and the state, refused to give Clinton any
120
land, electing instead to wait for Congress. Yet the subsequent
treaty session at Fort Stanwix between congressional commissioners

114. See ALAN TAYLOR, THE DIVIDED GROUND: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE
NORTHERN BORDERLAND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 111–19 (2006) (“Far from
intimidating the Indians, the British troops and their posts were hostages that enabled the
Indians to compel concessions. . . . Interpenetrated and interdependent with the Six Nations, the
British could not afford a rupture with their native allies.”). See generally COLIN G. CALLOWAY,
CROWN AND CALUMET: BRITISH-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1783–1815 (1987).
115. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 62, at 306.
116. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 63, at 686–87.
117. See Letter from Governor Clinton to the U.S. Indian Comm’rs (Aug. 13, 1784), in 18
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 301, 301 (“I . . . expect[] however
and positively stipulat[e] that no long agreement . . . be entered into with Indians residing within
the Jurisdiction of this State, with whom only I mean to treat, prejudicial to its rights.”).
118. Letter from Jacob Read to George Washington (Aug. 13, 1784), in 21 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES, supra note 70, at 768, 768–69.
119. Id. at 769.
120. See Extracts from the Proceedings of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix Between New York
and the Six Nations, in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 305, 307;
see also HORSMAN, supra note 12, at 17 (“The Six Nations replied shrewdly to [New York’s]
offer. Joseph Brant, the well-educated, articulate Mohawk chief, attempted to draw the federal
government into the negotiations.”).
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and representatives of the Six Nations only exacerbated the struggle
for jurisdiction. The commissioners assured the Six Nations that they,
not New York, had the “full authority” to negotiate, because
“without the authority of Congress no business can be valid that may
121
be attempted by particular people or States.” But Clinton disagreed.
He secretly instructed an agent, Peter Schuyler, to observe the treaty
negotiations and, if anything harmful to New York’s interests was
discussed, to “use your most undivided influence to Counteract and
122
frustrate” them. Schuyler plied the Indians with rum to forestall
123
negotiations. When the commissioners threatened to remove him,
he presented his credentials as a state officer, revealing to the
shocked commissioners that “the Governor and People of N[ew]
York have, from sinister Views, done everything in their power to
124
oppose us.” The angered commissioners then had federal troops
seize the disputed liquor, whereupon Schuyler had the county sheriff
125
arrest the officers for theft. Finally, the commissioners drove off the
sheriff, Schuyler, and his agents, and continued the treaty
126
negotiations.
Remarkably, even after this debacle, the United States managed
127
to secure a favorable treaty with the Six Nations, a reflection of the
128
Iroquois’ constrained choices more than congressional strength. But
this did not comfort observers. Congressional delegate Richard
Henry Lee thought the jurisdictional strife would encourage the

121. Proceedings of the United States and the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, in 18 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 313, 313.
122. Instructions for Major Peter Schuyler (Sept. 10, 1784), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 312, 312.
123. HENRY S. MANLEY, THE TREATY OF FORT STANWIX: 1784, 82–86 (1932).
124. TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 159 (alteration in original); see Proceedings of the United
States and the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, supra note 121, at 315 (finding Schuyler responsible
for “various direct and indirect means counteracting [the Commissioners’] negotiations” that
were “highly injurious to the service of the United States”).
125. MANLEY, supra note 123, at 82–86.
126. Id.; see TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 158–59. A suit against the congressional
commissioner Arthur Lee for confiscating the disputed liquor nonetheless proceeded, dragging
on until September 1787. See Letter from Charles Thomson to Robert R. Livingston (Apr. 13,
1786), in 23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 236, 236 &
n.2.
127. Treaty of Fort Stanwix, U.S.-Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
128. See SADOSKY, supra note 18, at 137–38.
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James Monroe, present for the treaty
country’s opponents.
negotiations as part of an excursion throughout the Northwest, was
alarmed by the impression that “the variance which had taken place
between the Indian Commissioners of the U. States, & those of New
York . . . . hath made with the Indians & in the Court of G. Britain
130
respecting us.” Writing to James Madison, who also had been at
Fort Stanwix for the beginning of the treaty session, Monroe
questioned whether the Six Nations could “even in the most qualified
sense” be considered “members of a State” merely because they lived
131
within its borders. Authority over such Indians, Monroe argued, “is
committed by the confideration to the U.S. in Congress assembled,”
but he also concluded that, even if “the right of Congress hath been
132
contraven’d,” there was no effective remedy for the offense.
Madison agreed with Monroe, strongly criticizing New York’s
construction of the Articles. If Article IX were “taken in its full
latitude,” he argued, it “must destroy the authority of Congress
altogether, since no act of Congs. within the limits of a State can be
conceived which will not in some way or other encroach upon the
133
authority [of the] States.” But Madison, too, felt that “whatever
may be the true boundary between the authority of Congs. & that of
134
N. Y.,” the best course of action was inaction. Monroe and Madison
understood that the national government was too weak to enforce its
135
legal authority on recalcitrant states.
Such federal weakness turned Congress’s qualified success in
securing the Treaty of Fort Stanwix into failure. Unable to defeat the
treaty, New York ignored it. The following year, Governor Clinton
demanded a land cession from the Oneidas, one of the Six Nations,
136
even though the treaty guaranteed their title. The Oneidas refused,
on the ground that “[t]he United States have informed Us that the
soil of our Lands was our own,” and declined to sell “until the
129. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Washington (Nov. 20, 1784), in 7 LETTERS
613, 613 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., Peter Smith
reprt. 1963) (1934).
130. Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (Nov. 15, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 140, 140 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 27, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 130, at 156, 156 (alteration in original).
134. Id. at 157.
135. Id.
136. Lehman, supra note 75, at 537–38.
OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
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Commissioners of the United States express the same Sentiment.”
138
But the tribe’s appeals to the national government were unavailing,
and Clinton cajoled, threatened, and bribed the Oneidas into
139
submission. Clinton later repeated the process by tricking the Six
140
Nations into a cession he misrepresented as a lease.
Congress’s success at securing Iroquois land through bluster
proved similarly short-lived. As word spread in Indian country that
141
the Treaty of Paris contained nothing about Native title, discontent
over the Treaty of Fort Stanwix grew: the Council of the Six Nations
refused to ratify it, and several Iroquois representatives repudiated
142
it.
Events further west proceeded similarly. At Fort McIntosh and
Fort Finney, Congress dictated treaties of conquest claiming much of
the Ohio Country to small delegations of the Shawnees, Delawares,
143
Wyandots, Chippewas, and Ottawas. Although lands north of the
144
Ohio River were federal territory after 1784, bands of Kentucky
settlers defied congressional authority and raided the region,
indiscriminately killing any Natives they encountered in revenge for

137. Extracts from the Proceedings of the Treaty at Fort Herkimer Between New York and
the Oneidas and Tuscaroras (June 23, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 332, 334–35.
138. The Oneidas twice sent delegations to Congress seeking support and protesting New
York’s seizure of land. TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 161. The Committee on Indian Affairs
promised the Oneidas “that congress will preserve inviolate the Treaty of Fort Stanwix” and
recommended sending an agent for this purpose, but nothing came of this recommendation. 29
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 806 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).
As historian Alan Taylor notes, “Hamstrung by the weak Articles of Confederation, Congress
lacked the funds and the leadership to fulfill its treaty promises to the Oneidas.” TAYLOR, supra
note 114, at 161.
139. TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 162–66; Lehman, supra note 75, at 537–38.
140. Lehman, supra note 75, at 543–45.
141. See Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (July 16, 1785), in 2 THE
ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 7, 7–8 & n.4.
142. 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 280; see NICHOLS, supra
note 8, at 31–32; see also Letter from David Howell to William Greene (Aug. 23, 1785), in 22
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 586, 588 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1995)
(noting that “several of the Sachems of the six nations” had requested “to take back the original
instruments of the two late Treaties”).
143. Treaty of Fort Finney, U.S.-Shawnee Nation, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26; Treaty of Fort
McIntosh, U.S.-Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa and Ottawa Nations, Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16; see
CALLOWAY, supra note 103, at 102–03.
144. Virginia ceded its territorial claims north of the Ohio River to the federal government
in 1784. Onuf, supra note 74, at 353. Kentucky remained part of Virginia. See id. at 372–73.
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purported Indian attacks. Federal treaties did little to stop the
raids—Kentucky militia “shot down” a Shawnee chief brandishing a
146
copy of the Treaty of Fort Finney and flying the American flag —
leading the Indians to conclude that, if they made an agreement with
the federal government, “the Kentuck poeple would brake it
147
immediatly.” But the treaties did have one concrete effect. As one
American military commander reported in alarm of the Treaty of
Fort McIntosh, “This treaty, and the one at Fort Stanwix . . . have had
the effect to unite the Indians, and induce them to make a common
148
cause of what they suppose their present grievances.”
Soon, rumors trickled in that the Indians were constructing a
149
confederacy of their own and threatening war. “On my arrival [in
October 1786],” Massachusetts delegate Rufus King wrote, “I found
congress deeply impressed with the Danger arising from a very
150
extensive combination of savages.” Events soon confirmed these
fears. Congress received an ultimatum from the “United Indian
145. See, e.g., EBENEZER DENNY, MILITARY JOURNAL OF MAJOR EBENEZER DENNY, AN
OFFICER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AND INDIAN WARS 93–94 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott &
Co. 1859) (describing a raid by Kentucky militia that “found none but old men, women and
children in the [Indian] towns; they made no resistance; the men were literally murdered”). For
background on the raids and counterraids that turned the Ohio River Valley into a “dark and
bloody ground” in the 1780s, see STEPHEN ARON, HOW THE WEST WAS LOST: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF KENTUCKY FROM DANIEL BOONE TO HENRY CLAY 29–57 (1996);
GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 153–211; NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 37–44, 57–68. On the political
debates in Congress over the violence in Kentucky, see Clinton, supra note 10, at 1124–27. One
particularly telling incident occurred when Major John Hamtramck, commanding federal forces
along the Ohio River, proclaimed to an invading Kentucky militia leader that Congress alone
could “order a war with the Indians; in co[n]sequence of which I ordered him in the name of the
United States to depart immediatly, and told him I should report him.” Letter from John
Hamtramck to Josiah Harmar (Aug. 31, 1788), in OUTPOST ON THE WABASH, 1787–1791, at
114, 114–15 (Gayle Thornbrough ed., 1957) (alteration in original). The Kentuckians, insisting
on their own independent authority, defied Hamtramck, stole his canoes, and then killed
friendly Indians serving the U.S. Army and took their horses. Id. at 115–16. “Never was my
feeling so much wonded before,” the “humiliat[ed]” Hamtramck reported, “But what could I
do? I had but nine men fit for duty.” Id. Although this contretemps occurred in 1788, it is
indicative of the broader struggle for authority in the region prior to June 1787.
146. Letter from Colonel Harmar to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (Nov. 15, 1786), in 2 THE
ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 18, 19.
147. Letter from John Hamtramck to Josiah Harmar, supra note 145, at 119.
148. Letter from Captain John Doughty to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (Oct. 21, 1785), in 2
THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 9, 9–10.
149. See, e.g., id.; see also Letter from James Manning to Nicholas Brown (July 15, 1786), in
23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 399, 401 (“The Alarms
of an Indian War are growing more & more serious . . . .”).
150. Letter from Rufus King to James Bowdoin (Oct. 20, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 606, 606.
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Nations,” consisting of the Iroquois, Cherokees, and numerous Ohio
151
Country tribes. Blaming Congress for the “mischief and confusion”
in the borderlands, the nations demanded Congress treat with the
152
entire Indian confederacy. The Natives insisted they would hold “all
153
partial treaties as void and of no effect,” and, should “fresh ruptures
ensue . . . [we] shall most assuredly, with our united force, be obliged
to defend those rights and privileges which have been transmitted to
154
us by our ancestors.”
This pan-Indian union to defend Native land and sovereignty
155
profoundly threatened the United States. Not only were their
156
numbers “very formidable,” but the prospect of war came as the
public purse was “intirely empty”; Congress was so impoverished it
157
had to borrow sixteen dollars to reimburse a delegation of Indians.
“With an exhausted Treasury,” one delegate despaired, Indian war
158
would be “a calamitous event.” Secretary at War Henry Knox put it
more diplomatically. Reporting to Congress in July 1787, he observed
“that the finances of the United States . . . render them utterly unable
159
to maintain an Indian war with any dignity or prospect of success.”
The only option, Knox advised, was to return to the customary
160
practice of paying for Indian lands. Congress acquiesced: “[I]nstead
of a language of superiority and command; may it not be politic and
Just to treat with the Indians more on a footing of equality . . . ?” the

151. Speech of the United Indian Nations to Congress (Dec. 18, 1786), in 18 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 356, 356–58.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 357.
154. Id. at 358.
155. See GREGORY EVANS DOWD, A SPIRITED RESISTANCE: THE NORTH AMERICAN
INDIAN STRUGGLE FOR UNITY, 1745–1815, at 90–94 (1992).
156. Letter from Captain John Doughty to Henry Knox, Sec’y of War, supra note 148, at 10.
157. Letter from James Manning to Nicholas Brown (June 9, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 345, 345–46.
158. Letter from James Manning to Nicholas Brown, supra note 149, at 401. For other
comments by delegates that Congress was ill-prepared to fight the looming Indian war, see
Letter from William Grayson to Beverley Randolph (June 25, 1787), in 24 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 341, 341 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1996); Letter from James
Manning to Jabez Bowen (June 9, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–
1789, supra note 86, at 343, 344; Letter from James Manning to Hezekiah Smith, supra note 86,
at 294.
159. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 388 (Roscoe R. Hill ed.,
1936).
160. Id. at 388–89.
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Committee on Indian Affairs inquired as it recommended “fairly
161
purchasing” Native land.
Congress’s newfound commitment to diplomacy reflected the
hard lessons of congressional weakness. Unable to restrain New
York’s land hunger or overawe the Indian confederacy, Congress had
to placate Natives to avoid a war it could not afford. This shift came
too late; the arrogance of congressional policy had caused irrevocable
damage. But in the summer of 1787, the delegates were distracted not
only by the Convention, but by another Indian war on the southern
frontier, where federal Indian policy failed even more dramatically.
2. The South. With its focus on the Six Nations, Congress’s aims
for southern Indian affairs were more modest: treaties would draw a
clear boundary between the United States and the Creeks,
Cherokees, Chickasaws, and other southern Indian nations, based
162
largely on existing claims. State purchases would be considered
valid only if they were “perfectly consistent with the design of the
163
Treaties now proposed to be held.”
The clear property line Congress envisioned was all but
unattainable in the postrevolutionary southern borderlands, where
states were eagerly engrossing Native land. The Creek word for
Georgians summed up the situation: they called them
“Ecunnaunuxulgee”—“People greedily grasping after the lands of the
164
red people.” Georgia quickly sought to conclude treaties with
handfuls of Creeks and Cherokees to cede the state huge chunks of
165
Native territory. When suasion or bribes failed to sway these
nominal Native leaders, the Georgians reportedly resorted to death
166
threats to compel agreement. Equally avaricious for Indian land,
North Carolina dispensed with diplomacy altogether; its legislature

161. Id. at 479–80; see Merrell, supra note 29, at 204.
162. See 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 453–64 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1928) (describing congressional plans to “establish a boundary line between us and
[the Indians]” while taking care “neither to yield nor require too much”); see also HORSMAN,
supra note 12, at 27 (“Congress would be content with peace and the status quo in the
South . . . .”).
163. 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 162, at 459.
164. Merrell, supra note 29, at 200 (quotation marks omitted).
165. E.g., Treaty of Augusta with the Cherokees (May 31, 1783), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 368, 368–69; Treaty of Augusta with the Creeks (Nov. 1,
1783), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 372, 372–73.
166. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Governor Estevan Miró (May 1, 1786), in JOHN
WALTON CAUGHEY, MCGILLIVRAY OF THE CREEKS 106, 106–07 (1938).
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confiscated most of the Indian lands within state borders by statute.
The little land the state reserved for the Cherokees was in turn
claimed by western North Carolinians, who concluded highly dubious
Indian treaties of their own on behalf of their would-be secessionist
168
state of Franklin.
The states’ arrogant demands for Indian lands dramatically
overreached. Like the Six Nations, the Creeks, Cherokees, and
169
Choctaws were not defeated nations. And like the northern tribes,
southern Natives exploited their location—in their case, bordering
the Spanish-held Gulf Coast—to secure European patronage.
Alexander McGillivray, the Charleston-educated son of a Scottish
trader and Creek mother well-versed in the niceties of European
diplomacy, solicited Spanish protection for the Creek nation he
170
claimed to represent. McGillivray successfully concluded formal
treaties with the Spanish that guaranteed Creek territories against
171
172
incursions; other Indian nations threatened to do the same.
Bolstered by Spanish arms and support, the Native nations of the
Southeast refused to tolerate Anglo-American infringement of their
173
territory and vowed to remove offending squatters themselves.

167. Act of Apr. 18, 1783, ch. 2, 1783 N.C. Sess. Laws 322, 322–25. The law set aside a small
parcel for the Cherokees. Id.
168. See, e.g., Treaty of Dumplin Creek (June 10, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 386, 386–87. Franklin, located in present-day eastern Tennessee,
was created in 1784 when white settlers seceded from North Carolina after it revoked its cession
of western lands to the federal government. Franklin tried, and failed, to secure entry as a state
from the Continental Congress, and the short-lived separatist movement petered out by 1788,
shortly before the region became part of the newly created Southwest Territory under federal
control. See generally KEVIN T. BARKSDALE, THE LOST STATE OF FRANKLIN: AMERICA’S
FIRST SECESSION (2009).
169. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens (Sept. 5, 1785), in 18
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 387, 388 (rejecting Georgians’
assertions of the Creeks’ “supposed distressed situation” and insisting that “we know our own
limits, . . . and, as a free nation . . . we shall pay no regard to any limits that may prejudice our
claims, that were drawn by an American, and confirmed by a British negotiator”).
170. For background on McGillivray, see generally CAUGHEY, supra note 166, at 3–53;
CLAUDIO SAUNT, A NEW ORDER OF THINGS: PROPERTY, POWER, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CREEK INDIANS, 1733–1816, at 67–89 (1999).
171. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens, supra note 169, at 388.
172. See Talk from Chickasaw Chiefs to the President of Congress (July 28, 1783), in 18
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 370, 370 (“The Spaniards are sending
talks among us and inviting our young men to Trade with them.”).
173. See Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens, supra note 169, at 388
(reporting Creek determination to “remove [infringing] people and effects from off the lands in
question, in the most peaceable manner possible”).
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Southern Indian policy accordingly forced the United States to
navigate between aggressively expansionist states and assertive,
powerful Native nations. Congressional commissioners attempted to
conciliate both sides at Hopewell in 1785, where they concluded
174
treaties with the Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws. The
treaties assuaged Indian complaints of encroachments on their lands
by creating a boundary between tribes and Anglo-American
175
settlement. Infringing squatters would be removed within six
months, the commissioners promised, or else they would “forfeit the
protection of the United States” and be left for the Indians to punish
176
“as they please.”
Yet these concessions enraged the states, particularly because
the treaties did not recognize their purported purchases. Before the
treaties were signed, the North Carolinians and Georgians in
177
attendance protested federal interference in their land policy.
William Blount, a North Carolina delegate to Congress, subsequently
mailed the commissioners the state’s constitution outlining its
borders—which, he pointed out, predated the Articles—and informed
them that the state regarded the treaty with the Cherokees as “a
178
violation and infringement upon her legislative rights.” The state’s
governor told Congress that the treaties “are so repugnant to our Bill
of Rights and Constitution, and so great an infringement on the
Rights of the Legislature of this State that it becomes my duty to
179
require that you do not by any means consent to the Ratification.”
Georgia’s assembly went further. Infuriated by this “manifest and

174. HORSMAN, supra note 12, at 29–30. Too few Creeks attended to secure an agreement.
Letter from Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin & Lachlan McIntosh, U.S.
Indian Comm’rs, to Congress (Nov. 17, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 392, 392. For further background on the Treaties of Hopewell, see CALLOWAY,
supra note 103, at 103–05; NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 46–54. See generally Greg O’Brien, The
Conqueror Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-Revolutionary
Southern Frontier, 67 J. S. HIST. 39 (2001).
175. Proceedings of the Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, in 18 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 393, 395–99.
176. Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.-Chickasaws, art IV, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24, 25; Treaty of
Hopewell, U.S.-Choctaws, art. IV, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, 22; Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.Cherokees, art. V, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, 19.
177. Proceedings of the Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, supra note 175, at 401.
178. Letter from William Blount to Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin &
Lachlan McIntosh, U.S. Indian Comm’rs (Nov. 28, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 402, 403.
179. Governor Richard Caswell to the Delegates in Congress (Apr. 3, 1786), in 18 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 428, 428.
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direct attempt to violate the retained sovereignty and legislative right
of this State,” it legislated “[t]hat all and every act and thing done, or
intended to be done, within the limits and jurisdiction of this State, by
180
the said commissioners . . . shall be . . . null and void.” Congress
181
accepted the treaties anyway.
These internecine squabbles destroyed Congress’s credibility
among Natives. McGillivray’s informants told him that at the
negotiations with the Creeks, “the Commissioners & Gov. of Georgia
quarrelld & thereby rendered themselves Completely ridiculous, in
182
the eyes of the Indians.” Moreover, because enforcement of the
treaties depended on state cooperation, states’ hostility would, as the
183
commissioners wrote, “render [them] ineffectual.”
Their fear was soon realized. The predictable failure to remove
squatters eroded Indian confidence in Congress. “We have held
several treaties with the Americans,” Chief Tassel of the Cherokees
lamented, “when Bounds was always fixt and fair promises always
made that the white people Should not come over, but we always find
184
that after a treaty they Settle much faster than before.” Earlier,
“when we treated with Congress we made no doubt but we should
have Justice”; now the Cherokees began to credit rumors “that the
Americans only ment to deceive us” and buy time “till all our lands is

180. Extract from the Minutes of the Georgia General Assembly (Feb. 11, 1786), in 18
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 427, 428.
181. 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 187–95 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934). The Articles made no provision for treaties’ ratification, but a
congressional motion by North Carolina’s delegates to disavow the Treaty of Hopewell with the
Cherokees was tabled and evidently never voted on. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 237–38 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).
182. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill (Feb. 10, 1786), in
CAUGHEY, supra note 166, at 102, 103.
183. See Letter from Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin & Lachlan
McIntosh, U.S. Indian Comm’rs, to Congress (Dec. 2, 1785), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 408, 409.
184. Talks from Cherokees to Colonel Martin (Mar. 24, 1787), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 444, 444; see also Talk from William Elders to General
Joseph Martin (Oct. 1788), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 475,
475 (“We well remember, whenever we are invited into a treaty, as observed by us at that time,
and bounds are fixed, that the white people settle much faster on our lands than they did
before.”).
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185

Settled.” These suspicions of congressional duplicity rapidly became
186
“universal through the Indians.”
Despairing of Congress, the Natives turned to self-help. Refusing
to negotiate with Georgia, the Creeks drove Anglo-American settlers
187
off their territory. Bloodshed ensued. As both sides prepared for
war, Congress appointed James White as a congressional agent to
188
conciliate the parties. But the ineffective White “might as well have
not Come into our Nation,” said Creeks disillusioned by his
189
Violence resumed, for which Georgia blamed
powerlessness.
Congress: it had “interfere[d] with treaties of the State” and conveyed
to the Indians “that in a war with the State, they should not have the
190
strength of the Union to fear.” In fact, the Indians did not believe
that there was much to fear from the United States, because White’s
191
efforts had persuaded them “that the [A]mericans were afraid.”
Secretary at War Henry Knox watched these developments with
alarm. Reporting to Congress in July 1787, Knox blamed the violence
on states’ “flagrant[] . . . usurpation of the lands” guaranteed by the
192
treaties. Yet state power precluded “all effectual interference of the
193
United States” in the resulting disputes. “[I]t is apparent from every
representation,” Knox lamented, “that unless the United States do in
reality possess the power ‘to manage all affairs with the independent

185. Talks from Cherokees to Colonel Martin, supra note 184, at 444, 444.
186. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Generals Richard Winn, Andrew Pickens &
George Mathews, U.S. Indian Comm’rs (Sept. 15, 1788), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 471, 471.
187. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to John Habersham (Sept. 18, 1786), in CAUGHEY,
supra note 166, at 130, 130–31.
188. 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 747 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934).
189. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill (Apr. 18, 1787), in
CAUGHEY, supra note 166, at 149, 149.
190. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 24 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair
Clarke eds., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1832).
191. Letter from McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill, supra note 189, at 149. White’s
speech urged the Creeks to reject British and Spanish overtures, 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 22, persuading the Creek chiefs that the possibility they
might ally with “some power” was the source of the Anglo-Americans’ fear, Letter from
McGillivray to Governor Arturo O’Neill, supra note 189, at 149.
192. Report of the Secretary of War on the Southern Indians, supra note 20, at 450.
193. See id. at 449.
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tribes of indians’ to observe and enforce all treaties made by the
194
authority of the union that a general indian war may be expected.”
A month later, Congress’s Committee on Southern Indians
similarly blamed the “confusion, disputes and embarrassments” in
Indian affairs on Georgia and North Carolina’s interpretation of
195
Article IX. “The construction contended for by those States,” the
Committee noted, “leave[s] the federal powers, in this case, a mere
nullity . . . [yet] [t]he States . . . have actually pursued measures in
conformity to it. North Carolina has undertaken to assign land to the
Cherokees, and Georgia has proceeded to treat with the Creeks
196
concerning peace[] [and] lands.”
The Committee, however,
maintained that before the Revolution the power over Indian
affairs—to make treaties, purchase Indian lands, and evict illegal
settlers—had been “possessed by the King, and exercised by him nor
did they interfere with the legislative right of the colony within its
197
limits.” Regarding these powers as “indivisible,” the Committee
members reasoned that the parties to the confederation “must have
198
intended to give them entire to the Union.”
The report concluded by stressing that Congress would not fight
unless it would have “the sole direction” over the war and any peace
199
terms. But the Committee on Southern Indians’ resolutions never
got a vote. Even though fifteen of the twenty delegates present
supported the proposals, Georgia was able to use the Articles’
convoluted voting procedures to defeat this supermajority and scuttle
200
the report.
By the summer of 1787, then, Congress confronted failure on the
southern as well as the northern borderlands. On both frontiers, the

194. Id. at 450. Secretary Knox appears to have been quoting, albeit inaccurately, Article
IX, paragraph 4 of the Articles of Confederation.
195. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 159, at 457–58.
196. Id. at 457.
197. Id. at 458.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 462.
200. Because Georgia made a preemptive motion, a motion to postpone was required in
order to take up the Committee on Southern Indians’ report. Id. at 463. This motion needed
seven state votes to pass. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 6. In practice
however, because only seven states were present and able to vote, the motion had to pass
unanimously. The motion failed when the Virginia and North Carolina delegations divided. 33
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 159, at 463. Georgia itself
could not vote because it lacked the required two delegates. See id.; cf. ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2.
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states, anxious to seize Indian land, first fought and then ignored
congressional treaties. Disillusioned tribes turned away from the
United States, first toward Britain and Spain, and then toward
violence as the only effective check on Anglo-American expansion.
As the Convention gathered in Philadelphia, the nation confronted
two Indian wars of its own making it could ill-afford. “[A] protracted
Indian war,” Knox feared, “would be destruction to the republic,
201
under its present circumstance.”
D. Lessons of Failure
In April 1787, James Madison catalogued the “Vices of the
202
Political System of the U[nited] States.” It was a lengthy list: states’
reckless printing of paper money, Daniel Shays’s uprising of indebted
farmers in Massachusetts, and violations of the Treaty of Paris with
203
Great Britain all pointed to the inadequacy of the current regime.
In this context, the failure of national Indian policy and the prospect
of “war with the savages” represented “an additional evil to our many
204
evils.”
But there were two reasons the Articles’ shortcomings in Indian
affairs were particularly glaring. First, like earlier efforts at
confederation, the Articles reflected the view that external affairs
were the basic purpose and responsibility of a national government:
Article III stressed that the purpose of this “firm league of
205
friendship” was to protect each other from external attacks, and
Article IX granted Congress “sole and exclusive right and power”
over war and peace, ambassadors, military officers, and the resolution
206
of territorial disputes, as well as Indian affairs. And nearly all the
nation’s external affairs—relations with Britain and Spain, issues of
war and peace, even national credit—hinged on western expansion.
201. Letter from Henry Knox, Sec’y of War, to Governor Arthur St. Clair (Dec. 8, 1788), in
2 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 165, 166 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed.,
1934). Although Knox wrote in 1788, the situation that led to his dire warning was little altered
from the previous year. See HORSMAN, supra note 12, at 47–52 (observing that the “breakdown
of American Indian policy northwest of the Ohio River” continued into 1788–89, and that
“Indian affairs in the South were also in a state of chaos from 1787 to 1789”).
202. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 345, 348 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975).
203. Id. at 348–57.
204. Letter from Henry Lee to James Madison (Feb. 16, 1786), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 130, at 493, 493.
205. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III, para. 1.
206. Id. art. IX, para. 1.
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By 1787, the states had largely acknowledged the federal
government’s paramount role in the West: all except North Carolina
and Georgia had ceded the national government their extravagant
207
land claims. Congress subsequently created a template for orderly,
208
regulated western settlement through successive land ordinances.
But this success was hollow as long as Indians controlled the lands in
209
question. Surveyors’ attempts to draw the tidy property lines
210
envisioned by Congress consistently met Native resistance. In short,
211
as George Washington had earlier acknowledged, the West could
not be settled without addressing Indian affairs.
Second, the cause for the failure of national Indian policy
differed from many of the nation’s other challenges. Many ills
stemmed from the Articles’ silences, for the document included
212
nothing about state commercial regulations or internal rebellions.
But, with justification, Congress believed it possessed expansive
powers to control relations with Natives. As western Virginian
Robert Rutherford would later write to Madison, the Continental
Congress was “really fully impowered” to address “three subjects of
the first & last importance[:] Mony, Indian affairs and settling new

207. ONUF, supra note 18, at 149–72. Under its cession, Virginia retained control over lands
south of the Ohio River known at the time as the “Kentucky District.” Id. at 161.
208. See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST
ORDINANCE 21–66 (1987) (discussing the Land Ordinance of 1785); see also Land Ordinance of
1785, reprinted in 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 375, 375–
81.
209. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary at War to Congress (July 10, 1787), in 2 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 201, at 31, 32 (“[T]he whole western
territory, is liable to be wrested out of the hands of the Union, by lawless adventurers, or by the
savages . . . .”)
210. See, e.g., Letter from William Grayson to George Washington (May 27, 1786), in 4 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 81, 82 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy
Twohig eds., 1995) (“[T]he Geographer & surveyers have directions to proceed without delay to
carry the Ordinance into execution, which I presume they will execute provided the Indians will
permit them, of which however I have very great doubts.”); Letter from Colonel Harmar to
Henry Knox, Sec’y of War (Oct. 10, 1786), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 18, 18
(describing the retreat of surveyors because of the “very just apprehensions of danger” of
Indian attack); see also GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 191 (describing the effects of Indian attacks
on surveyors).
211. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 202, at 350 (noting that “the confederation is silent” on
the issue of internal state violence).
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213

states.” Nonetheless, “in all [these] Very great Concerns,” Congress
214
had failed, “wanting in Common prudence & attention.”
Indian affairs thus forced nationalists to confront the Continental
Congress’s shortcomings notwithstanding the grant of authority under
the Articles. They blamed Congress’s failure on the weakness of the
national state, particularly, as Madison put it, “[the] want . . . of
215
coercion in the Government of the Confederacy.” But they had
different views about who, exactly, needed to be coerced. While many
blamed the inability of the federal government to enforce treaties and
restrain states and squatters, others argued the fundamental problem
was the national government’s military impotence, which allowed
Natives to challenge it with impunity.
1. The Madisonian Reading. Near the top of Madison’s list of the
Articles’ deficiencies were state encroachments on federal authority,
the first example of which was “the wars and Treaties of Georgia with
216
the Indians.” This was a common view among nationalists in 1787.
Like Secretary at War Henry Knox and the congressional Committee
on Indian Affairs, they attributed the disastrous course of Indian
217
affairs to state and squatter interference with federal policy.
Indians, they believed, were generally “well behaved” and could be
placated through sensible treaties, which many Indians “faithfully
218
Observed.” But states and squatters did not share this commitment,
and their repeated violations of national treaties destroyed federal
credibility. “When treaties are made and promises given without
seeing them fullfilld,” one prominent western Virginian wrote, “[i]t
naturally gives the Savages an unfavourable Opinion of us and our
219
Government.” In the absence of promised federal protection, state
213. Letter from Robert Rutherford to James Madison (Aug. 22, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS
350, 351 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). By “Mony,”
Rutherford presumably meant the “sole and exclusive right and power” granted Congress in
Article IX of the Articles to “regulat[e] the alloy and value of coin struck by their own
authority, or by that of the respective States.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX,
para. 4.
214. Letter from Robert Rutherford to James Madison, supra note 213, at 351.
215. Madison, supra note 202, at 351.
216. Id. at 348.
217. See supra notes 192–201 and accompanying text.
218. Letter from Adam Stephen to James Madison (Nov. 25, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 271, 271 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). Although this
letter postdates the Convention by two months, it nicely summarizes the views of the
Madisonians, which had deeper roots.
219. Id.

OF JAMES MADISON
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and squatter incursions “force[d]” the Indians to fight. The prime
example, as the nationalists read it, was Georgia: the state’s “bloody
War” was a “consequence of their own violations of the Treaties held
221
by the Commissioners of the United States with the Indians.”
State interference in Indian affairs had several causes. One was
the ambiguous compromise on Indian affairs in Article IX: as the
nationalists lamented, the clause’s concessions to state sovereignty
allowed expansive readings that undermined congressional
222
jurisdiction and federal treaties. But the fundamental problem was
not the text. Nationalists who had examined the provision had all
concluded that the reading proposed by New York, North Carolina,
and Georgia was “absurd” and would render the clause
223
meaningless. And, as evidenced in congressional votes, nearly all
224
The more basic problem, as many
the other states agreed.
225
commentators recognized, was that the Articles provided no means
to resolve jurisdictional disputes of this sort. The only viable national
institution was Congress, but its cramped rules and protections for
state sovereignty foiled every attempt to coerce state cooperation on
Indian affairs.
Even more important was the question of sanction. Unable to
enforce federal Indian treaties directly, the national government was
reduced to appeals to states to ensure a “due observance” of treaty
provisions, even as interested states denied the treaties’ legitimacy

220. Id.; see also Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 14, 1786), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MAIN SERIES 596, 599 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954) (“In my
Opinion our Indian Affairs have been ill managed. . . . Indians have been murdered by our
People in cold Blood and no satisfaction given, nor are they pleased with the avidity with which
we seek to acquire their Lands.” (footnote omitted)).
221. Letter from Virginia Delegates to Edmund Randolph (Dec. 11, 1787), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 218, at 319, 320.
222. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 53, at 264 (James Madison) (“[The]
limitations in the articles of Confederation . . . render the provision [on Indian affairs] obscure
and contradictory. . . . What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State is not
yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal
councils.”); Clinton, supra note 10, at 1139 (“Saddled with an ambiguous compromise in the
Indian affairs clause of Article 9, the Continental Congress was never really able to assert the
sole and exclusive power over all Indian affairs.”); supra notes 195–198 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 131–135, 192–198 and accompanying text.
224. Clinton, supra note 10, at 1110, 1122–24; see supra notes 131–135, 192–198 and
accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text; see also Report of the Secretary of
War on the Southern Indians, supra note 20, at 449–50.
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226

altogether. Nothing barred states’ pursuit of their own treaties and
Indian policy. And policing treaty boundaries through occasional
expeditions of the nation’s miniscule military had proved a temporary
227
and ineffectual solution.
Drawing on a lengthy tradition, the Madisonians believed
centralization would resolve conflict over Indian affairs. Only a
scrupulous adherence to treaty promises and their rigorous
enforcement against states and squatters, they concluded, could avoid
the costly wars that had resulted from national weakness under the
Articles.
2. The Hamiltonian Reading.
But there was a different
interpretation of the causes of the failure of national Indian policy
under the Articles. Diverging from Madison, many nationalists
blamed the inability of the United States to overawe the Native
nations that controlled the borderlands. In this view, Indian hostility
was the product of British and Spanish intrigue, not encroachment on
Native lands. “I have not the smallest doubt,” wrote George
Washington of the British, “but that every secret engine in their
power is continually at work to inflame the Indian mind, with a view
to keep it at variance with these States for the purpose of retarding
228
our settlements to the Westward.”
The conclusion was clear: “[T]he Indians can only be restrained
229
by fear.” Treaties could not placate them, “for their Interest, and of
230
consequence their friendship, is on the other side.” Nor would mere
assertions of conquest suffice, for, as one congressional delegate

226. Letter from Charles Thomson, Sec’y of Congress, to the States (Apr. 22, 1786), in 23
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 86, at 250, 250.
227. Cf. Letter from Barthelemi Tardiveau to Josiah Harmar (Aug. 6, 1787), in OUTPOST
ON THE WABASH, supra note 145, at 26, 30–32 (“[N]o treaty of peace, likely to be lasting, can be
made with the Indians except you are invested with powers energetick enough to keep the
whites under subjection & call them to a severe account if, by any misconduct of theirs,
differences shou’d arise with the savages; and I think that you ought to lay this matter before
Congress.”).
228. Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (May 10, 1786), in 4 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES, supra note 210, at 41, 43.
229. Letter from Caleb Wallace to James Madison (Nov. 12, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 218, at 249, 250; see also Letter from Arthur Lee to Thomas
Mifflin (Nov. 19, 1784), available at http://wardepartmentpapers.org/docimage.php?id=680&
docColID=698&page=2 (reporting from the Fort Stanwix negotiations that “they [the Indians]
are Animals that must be subdued [and] kept in awe or they will be mischievous, [and] fear
alone will effect this submission”).
230. Letter from Caleb Wallace to James Madison, supra note 229, at 250.
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observed, “[T]he Indians will hardly be prevailed on, by seeing only
paper & parchments, to believe that the U. States are in fact the
231
Sovereigns of that Country.” And current military arrangements
were inadequate to this end. “[T]he few continental troops” under the
Articles, nationalists feared, had merely been “an object of contempt
and not of terror to the inimicable Tribes, with which we are
232
surrounded.” Overwhelming force alone seemed the solution to the
problems of Indian affairs.
Privately, Alexander Hamilton did not share the views of this
inchoate coalition of expansionist state officials, backcountry settlers,
233
and local nabobs of frontier counties. Yet at the Convention and in
The Federalist, he became the primary proponent for their diagnosis
of the state of Indian affairs. Like the Madisonians’ perspective, the
position advocated by Hamilton insisted on the need for a stronger
federal government. But in this vision, the strengthened national state
would not restrain states and squatters. Rather, the key constitutional
solution for Indian affairs was an expanded national military that
would strike fear into tribes—the “natural enemies” of the United
234
States, as Hamilton would later describe them.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
In Indian affairs, the Constitution was a wartime document.
Meeting as Congress and Secretary at War Henry Knox were drafting
235
their foreboding reports, the Convention’s delegates speculated
236
about the prospect of an all-out Indian war in anxious letters. “The
231. Letter from David Howell to William Greene, supra note 142, at 588.
232. Letter from Caleb Wallace to James Madison, supra note 229, at 250.
233. In the rare instances Hamilton discussed Indians in his correspondence, he largely
embraced views similar to Madison’s. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George
Clinton (Oct. 3, 1783), in 3 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 464, 468 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1962) (“[The] friendship [of the Indian nations] alone can keep our frontiers in peace. . . . The
attempt at the total expulsion of so desultory a people is as chimerical as it would be
pernicious.”).
234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 53, at 157, 161 (Alexander Hamilton); see infra
notes 374, 395 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text; see also HORSMAN, supra note 12, at
39 (“Congress was deluged with bad news regarding Indian affairs in July and August
1787 . . . .”).
236. See, e.g., Letter from William Blount to Richard Caswell (July 19, 1787), in 1 THE JOHN
GRAY BLOUNT PAPERS 321, 323 (Alice Barnwell Keith ed., 1952); Letter from James Madison
to Edmund Pendleton (Apr. 22, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 202, at
394, 396; Letter from Edmund Randolph to Virginia Delegates (Apr. 4, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 202, at 366, 366–67; cf. Letter from John Jay to Thomas
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newspapers Every day were almost filled with . . . the Danger we were
in from the Indians on our Borders,” the Anti-Federalist Abraham
237
Yates, Jr. later cynically recorded of the Convention. “Matters were
brought about by that Confusion . . . that now Everybody could see
that it was become Necessary (no Matter how) that something should
be done, that it was evident Congress had not sufficient
238
powers . . . .” In some respects, war had already begun: Indians
reportedly killed or captured as many as three thousand AngloAmericans between 1783 and 1790—two-thirds as many as had died
239
fighting in the Revolution.
This Part examines the solutions the Constitution offered for this
crisis. Parts II.A and II.B explore how the Madisonian and
Hamiltonian assessments of the Articles’ failure in Indian affairs
respectively translated into constitutional text.
A. The Madisonian Convention
Federal power over Indian affairs was not discussed until late in
240
the Convention. In August 1787, James Madison first proposed

Jefferson (July 24, 1787), in 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MAIN SERIES 618, 619
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) (“The Convention is sitting, but their Proceedings are secret. Our
Indian Affairs in the West still give us Uneasiness, and so I fear they will continue to do for
Reasons which you will not be at a Loss to conjecture.”). A Cherokee chief actually visited
Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph in Philadelphia as he was sitting as a delegate in the
Convention. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Beverley Randolph, Lieutenant Governor (July
12, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 315, 315.
237. Staughton Lynd, Abraham Yates’s History of the Movement for the United States
Constitution, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 223, 241 (1963) (footnote omitted). Full-text database
searches support Yates’s assertion: early American newspapers in the Readex American
Historical Newspapers database made 345 references to “savages” and 1,978 references to
“Indians” during 1787. See America’s Historical Newspapers, READEX, http://www.readex.com/
content/americas-historical-newspapers (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). Many of these references
stemmed from dispatches from Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and other western locations,
reporting on Indian attacks.
238. Lynd, supra note 237, at 241.
239. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 343–44 (1834). Four thousand thirty-five Anglo-American soldiers
died in the Revolution. 5 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 5-350 tbl.Ed1-5.
240. The first mention of Indians came when Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson proposed
on June 11, 1787, that representation in the lower house be based on the number of white and
other free inhabitants, as well as “three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the
foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes in each State.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 193. Wilson adopted this language directly
from a failed proposal to apportion revenue owed by each state under the Articles, which likely
explains the reference to taxation. See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–
1789, at 214–15 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (“[A]ll charges of war and all other expences that
have been or shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the
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what became the Indian Commerce Clause. To abrogate the
qualifiers of Article IX, he urged that Congress have the power to
“regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits
242
of the U[nited] States.”
This proposition went back to the
243
Committee of Detail, which instead suggested adding “and with
Indians, within the Limits of any State, not subject to the laws
244
thereof” to the clause it had already drafted giving Congress the
authority “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
245
the several States.” This recommendation ended up with another

United States in Congress assembled, . . . shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which
shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the whole number of free inhabitants,
and three-fifths of the number of all other inhabitants of every sex and condition, except Indians
not paying taxes in each State . . . .”). “[T]hree fifths of all other persons” referred to slaves and
provoked heated arguments lasting over two months. For the most comprehensive recent
treatments of this debate, see GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION:
SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 103–42
(2010); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO
RATIFICATION 77–90 (2009); Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little
Gained, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 427–30 (2001). By contrast, the exclusion of “Indians not
taxed” from representation was not discussed at all, appearing in each successive draft until
becoming part of Article I, Section 2. The Committee of Style subsequently modified the
language from Wilson’s proposal to read “excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
persons.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 590; see
also Savage, supra note 10, at 64–72 (providing a detailed drafting history of this provision).
241. Neither the Virginia nor New Jersey plans for the new federal government addressed
relations with Indians; only the less prominent Pinckney plan granted the legislature the
“exclusive power . . . of regulating Indian Affairs.” 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 607. In mid-July, the Committee of Detail, tasked with
creating a constitutional draft from the Convention’s resolutions, enumerated congressional
powers. In the Committee’s first draft, “Indian Affairs” was scrawled in the margin in the hand
of John Rutledge, South Carolina delegate and chair of the Committee. See 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 143; Committee of Detail Documents, 135
PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 239, 273 (2011). But the draft the Committee presented to the
Convention at the beginning of August omitted this addition. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 181–82 (reporting the enumerated powers
without Indian affairs).
242. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 321, 324.
Madison included this proposal in a lengthy list of congressional powers he wished included in
the Constitution. Id. at 324–25. By explicitly providing federal power within states, Madison’s
language eliminated the Articles’ limitation of federal authority to Indians “not members of any
of the States,” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5, a qualification which
had led to aggressive claims of state authority over Native nations within states’ nominal
borders, see supra Part I.C.
243. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 325.
244. Id. at 367.
245. Id. at 181.
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committee, the Committee on Postponed Parts, which simply added
247
“and with the Indian tribes” at the end of the Commerce Clause.
248
The Convention adopted the proposal and the Committee of Style
249
included it in its September 12 draft. It remained unaltered when
250
the Convention adjourned on September 17.
The Indian Commerce Clause as adopted was an ambiguous
success for Madison. It removed the confusing limitations of Article
IX and avoided the Committee of Detail’s effort to reintroduce
complex jurisdictional divisions. But, unlike Madison’s original
proposal, it did not explicitly endorse federal supremacy over Indian
relations. And neither Madison nor any other delegate seemed to
consider the implications of the shift from “Indian affairs” to
“Commerce,” a change that later interpreters would read as limiting
251
federal authority.
Fixating on the phrasing of the Indian Commerce Clause,
however, would miss the lesson of the Articles that formal legal
authority, however phrased, would not constrain states. Other
provisions of the Constitution that reflected this experience were
considerably more important for Indian affairs.
This was particularly true of treaties, where the struggles under
the Articles lurked in the background. Occasionally, these disputes
erupted, as when, late in the Convention on September 8, the
Committee of Eleven proposed exempting peace treaties from the
requirement of two-thirds approval from the Senate. The Committee
explained that it feared “that the exposed States, as S. Carolina or
252
Georgia, would urge an improper war for the Western Territory.”
Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina united with several
253
northern states to remove the provision. These three states then
voted as a block for several provisions intended to make it harder to

246. See BEEMAN, supra note 8, at 297–305 (describing the membership and work of the
Committee on Postponed Parts).
247. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 493, 497,
503.
248. Id. at 495.
249. Id. at 595.
250. Id. at 655, 665–66.
251. See e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565–71 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937, 939 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834) (No. 14,495);
Natelson, supra note 10, at 215; Prakash, supra note 10, at 1088–89.
252. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 548.
253. Id. at 546–50.
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ratify treaties. But none of the heightened requirements passed; the
255
three southern states were often their lone proponents.
These votes were typical: the Madisonians were remarkably
successful in strengthening the enforcement of federal treaties.
Perhaps the most important addition was the inclusion of federal
Indian treaties as the “supreme Law of the Land” in the Supremacy
256
Clause. At Madison’s urging, the Clause explicitly enumerated
treaties “made . . . under the Authority of the United States” as well
257
as future agreements to “obviate all doubt concerning the force of
treaties prëexisting”—including the Treaties of Fort Stanwix and
258
Hopewell. Moreover, under the Clause’s provisions, states could not
259
attempt to invalidate federal treaties, as New York, North Carolina,
and Georgia had done by enacting contrary laws or claiming that the
260
treaties violated state constitutions. Article VI further required that
state executive, judicial, and legislative officers swear fidelity to this
261
new constitutional order.
State power over Indian affairs was also limited by a slight
change in terminology. Article VI of the Articles had prohibited the
states from “enter[ing] into any conference, agreement, alliance or
treaty with any King, Prince or State” without congressional
262
consent. But the Constitution omitted these restrictions, providing
simply, “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
263
Confederation . . . .” By eliminating the qualifiers in the Articles

254. Among these restrictions were requiring support from two-thirds of all Senators, not
simply those present; requiring at least two-thirds of the Senate to be present; and mandating
that no treaty be made “before all the members of the Senate are summoned & shall have time
to attend.” Id. at 544, 546. New York was absent, so it is impossible to determine whether the
state would have also supported these proposals. See id. at 546.
255. Id.
256. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
257. Id.
258. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 417; see also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (“The constitution, by declaring treaties
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations . . . .”).
259. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (making federal law supreme “any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”).
260. See supra notes 107–108, 178–180 and accompanying text.
261. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
262. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1.
263. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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that seemed to exclude Indian treaties from this restriction, the
plain text of this provision prohibited the sort of state treatymaking
265
that had been so problematic under the Articles.
Other provisions expanded the federal government’s
institutional power to enforce treaties. Article I, Section 8 originally
gave Congress the power to “call forth” state militias “to execute the
266
Laws of the Union, [and] enforce treaties”; “enforce treaties” was
subsequently removed as “superfluous since treaties were to be
267
‘laws,’” but the intended meaning did not change. Still more
importantly, the new federal judiciary provided a forum both to
resolve jurisdictional disputes between the state and federal
268
governments and to ensure judicial enforcement of federal treaties:
Article III empowered federal courts to hear cases “arising
under . . . [the] Treaties made, or which shall be made” by the United

264. It is unlikely that the words “King, Prince or State” were understood to encompass
Indian tribes. Although the precise diplomatic status of Native nations remained ambiguous,
Anglo-Americans had abandoned the practice of referring to Native leaders as princes or kings,
and few would have considered Native polities “states.” Cf. GREGORY EVANS DOWD, WAR
UNDER HEAVEN: PONTIAC, THE INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE 174–212 (2002)
(arguing that colonists and British officials regarded Indians as “domestic, dependent nations”
in the 1760s (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831))). Moreover, the
drafting history suggests a European focus, as the phrasing originally referred to “the King or
Kingdom of Great Britain, or any foreign Prince or State.” 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 45, at 675.
265. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring)
(“Under the constitution, no state can enter into any treaty; and it is believed that, since its
adoption, no state, under its own authority, has held a treaty with the Indians.”); Duncan B.
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 769–72 (2009) (attributing the
development of the Compact Clause to the difficulties occasioned by state treatymaking with
Indian nations). An additional wrinkle is that the Articles gave Congress the sole and exclusive
power of “entering into treaties and alliances,” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX,
para. 1, which would seem to overlap with the provision in Article VI. But as Professor Duncan
Hollis notes, the creation of a separate Indian affairs power that reserved significant rights to
states seemed to supplant this restriction with respect to Indian treaties. Hollis, supra, at 771
n.144. Unlike the equivalent constitutional provision, this clause was evidently never cited to bar
state involvement with Indian affairs; on the contrary, even Madison conceded that states had
the right to treat with Indians for land under the Articles. See Letter from James Madison to
James Monroe, supra note 133, at 156–57.
266. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 182.
267. Id. at 389–90.
268. This is the central argument in ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010). As Professor LaCroix states: “[T]he combined efforts of the
delegates at Philadelphia produced a judicial mode of organizing federalism that was altogether
different from previous approaches to the problem of multiple authorities. . . . This judicially
driven federalism was a new species of government, embracing multiplicity and giving it an
institutional home in the judicial branches . . . .” Id. at 173–74.
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States. It also replaced the Articles’ convoluted quasi-judicial
process for resolving western land claims by providing original
Supreme Court jurisdiction over state border controversies and
270
competing state land grants.
Outside of the provisions concerning treaties, the most important
addition was the Property Clause. At the same time he proposed
federal authority over Indian affairs, Madison urged that Congress
271
have the power to “dispose” the western lands of the United States.
This ultimately became a provision granting Congress the power to
“make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
272
Territory . . . belonging to the United States.” The Property Clause
ensured that Congress would have exclusive jurisdiction over most of
273
the West until it admitted the territories as new states. It also
enabled Congress finally to criminalize illegal settlement on Indian
274
lands and, under Article III, to prosecute violators in new federal
275
courts far from sympathetic local juries.
The delegates well understood the implications of this grant: one
of the Property Clause’s key purposes was to provide explicit
276
authority for the legally dubious Northwest Ordinance, which the
Continental Congress had enacted the previous month to govern all
277
national territory north of the Ohio River. A “compact” that would
“forever remain unalterable,” the quasi-constitutional Ordinance
coincided with the Convention and established fundamental

269. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
270. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX,
para. 2.
271. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 321.
272. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
273. I am indebted to Peter Onuf for drawing my attention to this point.
274. Washington had earlier questioned whether Congress possessed this power under the
Articles. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
275. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Violators could be tried “at such Place or Places as the
Congress may by Law have directed.” Id.
276. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 53, at 239 (James Madison) (describing the
Northwest Ordinance as being enacted “without the least color of constitutional authority”).
The First Congress subsequently reenacted the Ordinance. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50;
see also Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 96 (1850) (noting that the provisions of the
Northwest Ordinance owed “their legal validity and force, after the Constitution was adopted
and while the territorial government continued, to the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, which
adopted and continued the Ordinance of 1787”).
277. See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 181, at 334.
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structures and principles of territorial governance. Many of the
rights the Ordinance guaranteed prefigured protections written into
279
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
The Northwest Ordinance strongly reflected the Madisonian
vision for the West, securing “peace and good order” through the rule
280
of law. Article III dictated the “fundamental principles” of the
territory’s Indian policy, providing:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians,
their lands and property shall never be taken from them without
their consent; and, in their property, rights and liberty, they shall
never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars
authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity
shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done
281
to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.

This provision of the Northwest Ordinance epitomized the
paternalist solution for Indian affairs. But its emphasis on federal
control and restraint of western land hunger were also implicit in the
Constitution. The Indian Commerce Clause removed the ambiguous
qualifiers that existed in the Articles. Declaring and enforcing federal
treaties as the supreme law of the land remade federalism. And the
Property Clause ensured that Congress, not the states, would govern
westward expansion through statutes such as the Northwest
Ordinance. For those who claimed the national government’s failure
to restrain states and squatters had produced the calamities of federal
Indian policy, the Constitution provided much cause for optimism.

278. Id. at 339–40; see also ONUF, supra note 208, at xiii–xxi (“[T]he Ordinance was treated
as a constitutional document.”); cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 258–61 (2012) (describing the
Ordinance as part of the “symbolic constitution”).
279. See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 181, at 340–43
(providing for, among other protections, the writ of habeas corpus, freedom of worship, jury
trial, and the prohibition of “cruel or unusual punishments”). See generally Matthew J.
Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Northwest
Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 1820 (2010)
(discussing the Ordinance’s effect on subsequent constitutional law, particularly the Fourteenth
Amendment).
280. See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 181, at 340–43.
281. Id. at 340–41.
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B. The Hamiltonian Convention
Yet if Madison’s goal was to create a federal government that
could pursue national interests free from state parochialism, he
achieved imperfect success. Despite frequent talk of abolishing states
282
altogether during the Convention, the thirteen states retained
independence and sovereignty under the Constitution. And through
the creation of the Senate, the supermajority requirement for treaties,
and the Electoral College, the states could exert considerable
influence over federal policy even when the Constitution explicitly
limited state authority.
This was certainly true in Indian affairs, where, despite the
Madisonians’ reforms, states retained significant control. Although
the Constitution sharply restricted states’ treaty powers, it did little to
constrain states’ authority over lands within their borders. And those
borders remained capacious. Toward the end of the Convention,
delegates from states without claims to western territory demanded
that the Constitution guarantee national ownership of western lands,
283
requiring that North Carolina and Georgia cede their claims. North
Carolina’s delegation objected that “attempts at compulsion was not
the policy of the U.S.,” and Abraham Baldwin of Georgia argued in
284
favor of adding explicit language to protect state claims. In the end,
the delegates agreed to a proviso to the Property Clause specifying,
“[N]othing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
285
any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.” The
Constitution also barred the dismemberment of these gargantuan
states by prohibiting the formation of a new state within the
286
jurisdiction of an existing state without legislative consent. In short,
the territory of Georgia and North Carolina, still extending to the
Mississippi River, was now constitutionally guaranteed, and the
federal government’s Property Clause power could not reach south of
the Ohio River until cession occurred. The most important Native

282. E.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 24,
136–37, 152–53, 202, 323, 337, 340, 355–57.
283. 2 id. at 462.
284. Id. at 462–65.
285. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
286. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia
Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 332–95 (2002) (discussing the text and history of
Article IV, Section 3).

ABLAVSKY IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE SAVAGE CONSTITUTION

1/27/2014 10:45 AM

1047

nations remained within states’ external borders and arguably under
state jurisdiction.
The expansionist states won another significant concession in the
Guarantee Clause, which promised that the “United States . . . shall
287
protect each [state] against Invasion.” More definitive than its
288
predecessor in the Articles, the Guarantee Clause mandated, in the
later words of treatise writer St. George Tucker, that “every state
which may be invaded must be protected by the united force of the
289
confederacy.” The Clause had initially specified that the invasion
must be “foreign,” but the Convention subsequently removed this
290
qualifier.
This constitutional commitment abrogated the
Continental Congress’s earlier refusal to intervene in Georgia’s
291
military struggles. The language of the provision instead required
federal military intercession if Indians attacked, even when the state
had instigated the conflict.
But the greatest success for land-hungry states and speculators
was the pervasive assumption throughout the Convention that the
country would expand inexorably westward. The delegates regarded
this prospect with attitudes ranging from anticipation to alarm. The
southern states consistently favored admitting new western states on
292
principles of equality. By contrast, some of the northern states

287. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
288. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III (“The said States . . . bind[] themselves
to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on
account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.”).
289. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA app. note D, 140, 367 (St. George Tucker ed., Phila., William Young Birch &
Abraham Small 1803).
290. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 459, 466.
Although this language was omitted because it was “superfluous,” id. at 466, its removal also
eliminated any doubt whether the clause required intervention in Indian wars, as it was an open
question whether an attack by Indians would have been a “foreign” invasion, cf. Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19–20 (1831) (holding that the Cherokee Nation was not a
“foreign” nation for the purposes of Article III’s case or controversy requirement).
291. See 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 159, at
455–62; see also supra note 200 and accompanying text.
292. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 584
(reporting Madison’s statement that “[w]ith regard to the Western States, he was clear & firm in
opinion that no unfavorable distinctions were admissible either in point of justice or policy”); cf.
id. at 372 (quoting North Carolina delegate Hugh Williamson arguing that the “new States to
the Westward” should not be required “to pay the expences of men who would be employed in
thwarting their measures & interests”).
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viewed the “rage for emigration . . . to the Western Country” with
293
trepidation. Western expansion, they believed, would be “suicide on
294
the old States,” and they proposed various methods to restrain the
295
West’s political and economic power in the Union. None passed.
But even the Convention’s most outspoken proponent of limiting
296
western power, Pennsylvania delegate Gouverneur Morris, did not
intend to repeat the Proclamation of 1763 and attempt to halt western
297
expansion altogether. At the Convention, Morris acknowledged
298
He subsequently
that such a move would be “impossible.”
reminisced: “I knew as well then, as I do now, that all North America
299
must at length be annexed to us.”
In part, the Constitution’s commitment to expansion stemmed
from its republican nature: the inclusion of democratic elements as
well as the process of ratification required negotiating with the views
300
of the “people out of doors” who were infected with “lust of
301
dominion.” “It would, therefore, have been perfectly Utopian,”
Morris later explained, “to oppose a paper restriction [on settlement]
302
to the violence of popular sentiment in a popular government.” But
293. 2 id. at 3.
294. Id. at 442.
295. See, e.g., 1 id. at 570–71 (proposing that the legislature ought to control the power of
apportionment to avoid shifting power to the future western states); id. at 582–84 (proposing
that, to diminish western influence, representation be based on property as well as population);
2 id. at 3 (proposing to limit the number of new states to the number of existing “Atlantic
States”).
296. See, e.g., id. at 583 (“[T]he Western Country . . . would not be able to furnish men
equally enlightened, to share in the administration of our common interests. . . . If the Western
people get the power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests. The Back members
are always most averse to the best measures.”).
297. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Nov. 25, 1803), in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, app. A at 401 (“I am very
certain that I had it not in contemplation to insert a decree de coercendo imperio [restraining
settlement] in the Constitution of America.”).
298. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 454.
299. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston, supra note 297, at 401. Morris
had contemplated excluding Louisiana and subsequently gained territories from statehood,
governing them as imperial provinces instead. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W.
Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 2, app. A at 404 [hereinafter Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec.
4, 1803)].
300. Alfred F. Young, The Framers of the Constitution and the “Genius” of the People, 42
RADICAL HIST. REV. 7, 7–47 (1988); see WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 200–12 (2007).
301. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston, supra note 297, at 401.
302. Id.
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the Constitution did not merely acquiesce in expansion, for, unlike
303
Morris, most delegates celebrated westward growth. Many agreed
with South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney’s comment at the
Convention that there would be “more equality of rank and fortune
in America than in any other country under the sun . . . as long as the
304
unappropriated western lands remain unsettled.” Others had more
personal reasons to support expansion. North Carolina delegate
Hugh Williamson later wrote, “[H]aving claims to a considerable
Quantity of Land in the Western Country I am fully persuaded that
the Value of those Lands must be increased by an efficient federal
305
Govt.” Though few would have put it so baldly, many other
306
delegates also had substantial western investments.
For most delegates, then, securing westward expansion, far from
a source of anxiety, was one of the most important purposes of a
307
strengthened federal government. This faith in inevitable expansion
made no mention of the Native nations who owned and governed this
vast territory. Only the Northwest Ordinance, consistent with its
paternalist approach, acknowledged that “from time to
308
time . . . [I]ndian titles shall have been extinguished.” But the
Convention’s vision of continental supremacy entailed an unspoken
309
commitment to colonizing and dispossessing Native peoples.
Williamson’s hope for an “efficient” government hinted at how
this would be accomplished. The Constitution provided the United
States with powerful new tools for dominating the borderlands that
reflected the document’s wartime context. It authorized Congress to
310
create a standing national army and to organize, arm, and command
303. Indeed, Morris stated that, had he expressed his views on expansion more “pointedly,”
“a strong opposition would have been made.” Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W.
Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), supra note 299, at 404.
304. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 410.
305. Letter from Hugh Williamson to James Madison (June 2, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 71, 71–72 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).
306. CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 23, 49–50, 176 (1925).
307. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 199
(reporting Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman’s statement that frequent legislative meetings
would be required because “[t]he Western Country . . . will supply objects” requiring
legislation).
308. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 181, at 337.
309. On the continental vision of the Constitution’s drafters and advocates, see generally
JAMES D. DRAKE, THE NATION’S NATURE: HOW CONTINENTAL PRESUMPTIONS GAVE RISE
TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 260–316 (2011).
310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 13–14.
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311

the state militias. It also created an executive with substantial power
over military and diplomatic affairs, including as commander in chief
312
over the national military and state militias. Even more importantly,
given the constant lack of funds under the Articles, Congress could
313
now tax directly to “provide for the common Defence.”
These provisions remedied the weaknesses that had plagued the
United States in its earlier dealings with Natives. The federal
government could purchase Indian lands if necessary, and could
supply tribes with “presents” that might wean them from British and
Spanish influence. Most significantly, the government could now
support the high-handed demands and threats it made to Native
nations. Rather than constantly placating Indians to avoid wars it
could not afford, the United States could turn to arms if necessary.
The new national government would be a much strengthened fiscal314
military state capable of instilling the “fear” and “terror” necessary
315
to control the borderlands.
In short, the Constitution created a national state that was
simultaneously weak and strong—too dependent on the states and
316
the people to resist “the violence of popular sentiment” but capable
of organizing and sustaining a military far more daunting than any
state militia. This was precisely what the expansionist states and
Anglo-American settlers wanted. Their libertarian streak ran only as
far as self-interest, for they welcomed a strengthened federal state as
long as it was an imperialist one, focused on projecting power against
317
the Indians rather than against its citizens. The Hamiltonians would
solve the problem of Indian affairs by committing the federal state to
empowering, not restraining, the inexorable westward tide.
III. THE RATIFICATION DEBATES
The Constitution submitted to the states for ratification
proposed two distinct solutions for Indian affairs. The Madisonian
311. Id. cl. 16.
312. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
313. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
314. EDLING, supra note 23, at 47–49, 227–29.
315. See supra notes 229–232 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
317. Cf. HULSEBOSCH, supra note 8, at 219–20 (“An important manifestation of popular
constitutionalism was . . . migration beyond existing jurisdictions and into Indian
country. . . . Before, during, and after the ratification campaign, settlers voted with their
feet. . . . [T]he hard fact of mobility conditioned the making of the Constitution.”).
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perspective restrained states by ensuring the supremacy of federal
diplomacy. The Hamiltonian approach embraced expansion and
considered the federal military a powerful tool to defeat Native
nations. This Part traces the course of these discourses during the
nation’s hard-fought ratification contests, “the first national election”
that engaged the public in debating the Constitution through a torrent
318
of print and popular politics. Unlike at the Convention, discussions
of the Constitution’s likely effect on Indian affairs figured
prominently in ratification, appearing in newspaper articles,
319
pamphlets, letters, speeches, and even public toasts.
In this wide-ranging debate, the two constitutional perspectives
fared differently. As Part III.A traces, James Madison and other
Federalists occasionally argued in favor of the centralization of Indian
affairs, but their arguments served primarily as fodder for AntiFederalist critiques of constitutional overreach. By contrast, as
detailed in Part III.B, the invocation of federal military power as a
check on the “savages” became a standard part of Federalist rhetoric.
This proved successful: in Georgia, Part III.C suggests, the prospect
of federal military aid against the Creeks secured ratification. But this
process also ensured that the Hamiltonian construction would
become the dominant understanding of the Constitution in the
ensuing years, as Part III.D explores.

318. For background on the ratification debates, see generally MAIER, supra note 8;
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989);
Critical Forum, Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788, 69 WM. &
MARY Q. 361 (2012). Until recently, ratification was an afterthought in most constitutional
histories. See MAIER, supra note 8, at ix–xi (noting the overwhelming body of work on the
Convention, whereas ratification is neglected or relegated to “a chapter or two that give a quick
summary of the ratification process”); Forrest McDonald, Foreword to RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra, at ix, ix (noting “the paucity of historical accounts of ratification”). The
exception to this generalization is The Federalist, which has spawned a “small industry” of
interpretation. MAIER, supra note 8, at ix–xi. As Professor Pauline Maier notes, The Federalist
is usually examined outside of its ratification context as “a dispassionate, objective analysis of
the Constitution” rather than as the “partisan statement written in the midst of a desperate fight
in a critical state” that it was. Id. at xi; see also McDonald, supra, at ix (noting that the “The
Federalist . . . though written as propaganda in support of ratification in New York, is rarely
dealt with as such”). This narrow focus obscures the tremendous outpouring of public
statements on the Constitution. See KRAMER, supra note 26, at 78 (“Thoughts expressed by the
Framers behind closed doors in Philadelphia are ultimately of less interest than the public
debate that took place over ratification. . . . Understandings expressed during the discussions
about whether to ratify . . . are what matter most.”); MAIER, supra note 8, at ix–xvi (“Debate
over the Constitution raged in newspapers, taverns, coffeehouses, and over dinner tables as well
as in the Confederation Congress, state legislatures, and state ratifying conventions.”).
319. See infra Parts III.A–B.
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A. Madisonian Ratification
For many Federalists, the “mighty difference” between the
Articles and the Constitution lay not in Congress’s constitutionally
enumerated powers, many of which mirrored those in the Articles,
320
but in the means granted to accomplish those ends. As Madison
wrote in Federalist No. 45, “If the new Constitution be examined with
accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it
proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the
321
Union than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS.”
One of the powers the Articles had granted Congress was “that
322
they shall regulate Indian affairs.” But experience had underscored
that this authority alone was insufficient, “there being no sanctions to
323
it.” States had routinely flouted federal jurisdiction, with disastrous
results. “Not a single Indian war has yet been produced by
aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is,” John
324
Jay argued in Federalist No. 3. “[B]ut there are several instances of
Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of
individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish
offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent
325
inhabitants.”
Federalist No. 42 presented Madison’s solution. There, he
examined constitutional provisions intended to “provide for the
326
harmony and proper intercourse among the States,” one of which
was the Indian Commerce Clause. The Clause, he argued, was “very
properly unfettered from two limitations in the Articles of
Confederation, which render the provision obscure and
327
contradictory.” First, the Clause was no longer limited to Indians
“not members of any of the States,” a vague restriction whose scope

320. Editorial, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Mass.), Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MASSACHUSETTS
245, 246 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1997).
321. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 53, at 293 (James Madison); see also Editorial,
supra note 320, at 245 (“The Confederation points out what positive powers the Congress ought
to have: the fœderal Constitution points out what positive powers the Congress actually shall
have.”).
322. Editorial, supra note 320, at 246.
323. Id. at 245.
324. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 53, at 44 (John Jay).
325. Id.
326. Id. NO. 42 at 267 (James Madison).
327. Id. at 268.

ABLAVSKY IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE SAVAGE CONSTITUTION

1/27/2014 10:45 AM

1053

had “been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the
328
Second, the Clause contained no language
federal councils.”
reserving states’ legislative rights. “[H]ow the trade with Indians,”
Madison wrote, “though not members of a State, yet residing within
its legislative jurisdiction can be regulated by an external authority,
without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is
absolutely incomprehensible”—a glaring instance, to Madison, of
how the Articles had sought “to accomplish impossibilities; to
reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete
329
sovereignty in the States.” Federalist No. 42 thus read Madison’s
qualified success in recasting the Indian Commerce Clause as a clear
endorsement of federal supremacy.
A far more negative assessment of federal power over Indian
affairs appeared in a New York Journal article by Anti-Federalist
330
Abraham Yates, Jr. under the pseudonym Sydney. Yates argued
ratification would “render[] nugatory” much of New York’s
constitution, including provisions granting it authority over Indian
331
affairs. Yates condemned “the whole history of . . . the measures
taken by Congress respecting the Indian affairs in this state” as “a
series of violations” of the state’s constitution and the restrictions of
332
the Articles. He particularly attacked the Treaty of Fort Stanwix,
including the commissioners’ “defiance [of] the civil authority of the
333
county of Montgomery.” Yates continued:
If this was the conduct of Congress and their officers, when
possessed of powers which were declared by them to be insufficient
for the purposes of government, what have we reasonably to expect
will be their conduct when possessed of the powers “to regulate

328. Id. at 268–69.
329. Id. at 269.
330. Sydney, To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, reprinted in
20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK
1153 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004). Although earlier scholarship attributed the “Sydney”
essays to Robert Yates, the most thorough histories of ratification cite evidence overwhelmingly
suggesting that Abraham Yates, Jr. authored the pieces. See id. (citing Abraham Yates’s
personal correspondence); Sidney, Essay, N.Y.J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 19 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK 115, 115
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003) (citing draft essays in Abraham Yates’s hand, contemporary
correspondence, and Yates’s own claim of authorship); see also MAIER, supra note 8, at 343
(attributing the Sydney essays to Abraham Yates).
331. Id. at 1156.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1157; see also supra notes 121–127 and accompanying text.
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commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes,” when they are armed with legislative,
executive and judicial powers, and their laws the supreme laws of
the land . . . and all such laws subject to the revision and controul of
Congress.
It is therefore evident that this state, by adopting the new
government, will enervate their legislative rights, and totally
surrender into the hands of Congress the management and
334
regulation of the Indian affairs . . . .

Yates and Madison agreed that ratification would result in federal
supremacy over Indian affairs. Yates also understood, perhaps better
than Madison, the broad panoply of powers given the new
government, particularly the Supremacy Clause, that would yield this
335
result. But Yates, an “extreme” Anti-Federalist,
construed
Madison’s centralizing scheme for Indian affairs as a fundamental
attack on New York’s autonomy. And he evidently believed other
New Yorkers would feel similarly.
But neither Madison’s nor Yates’s discussion of federal
supremacy and Indian affairs was representative. They were the only
two authors to mention the Indian Commerce Clause or seriously
consider the broader issue of federal authority over relations with the
Indians. Part of this silence stemmed from the agreement by at least
some Anti-Federalists that the new federal government should have
336
power over external matters, including Indian affairs. But it also
reflected the fact that, as at the Convention, ratification debates over
Indians focused on the question of treaties.

334. Sydney, supra note 330, at 1158. Yates also mentioned the limitation on states’ laying of
duties on imports and exports. Id.
335. Lynd, supra note 237, at 225 n.9.
336. See, e.g., Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, Letter I (Nov. 8, 1787), reprinted in
14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 14, 24 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (“Let the general government[’s] . . . powers extend exclusively
to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the seas, to commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian
affairs, peace and war . . . leaving the internal police of the community, in other respects,
exclusively to the state governments . . . .” (emphasis added)); The Dissent of the Minority of the
Pennsylvania Convention, PA. PACKET, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 7, 21 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1984) (endorsing “a confederation of republics, possessing all the powers of internal
government; but united in the management of their general, and foreign concerns”).
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The Federalists repeatedly bemoaned treaties’ ineffectiveness
under the Articles. As Alexander Hamilton noted, “The treaties of
the United States under [the Articles] are liable to the infractions of
337
thirteen different legislatures.” This view extended to those on the
frontier. The inhabitants of Schenectady, New York, despaired of the
collapse of their once booming Indian trade and blamed the
continued British occupation of the western posts. “The tracing the
Cause of our Wretchedness, points out the Remedy: Give Powers to
your own Representatives which will be sufficient to compel the
338
Performance of Treaties as well as to make them.”
For Federalists, one important solution to the problem of state
interference was the creation of federal courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, which would avoid contradictory interpretations and
339
local bias in enforcing treaties. Another was to include federal
treaties within the Supremacy Clause, thereby compelling
compliance. “Is it not necessary that [treaties] should be binding on
the States?” delegate Francis Corbin asked at the Virginia ratifying
340
convention. “Fatal experience has proved, that treaties would never
be complied with, if their observance depended on the will of the
States; and the consequences would be constant war. . . . Do not
Gentlemen see the infinite dangers . . . if a small part of the
341
community could drag the whole Confederacy into war?”
The inclusion of treaties within the Supremacy Clause was
particularly contentious in Virginia, where the state’s western
residents were deeply hostile to the Jay–Gardoqui Treaty of 1786,
342
which closed the Mississippi River to American navigation. This
debate quickly expanded to include Indian treaties. Arthur Campbell,

337. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 53, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton).
338. SCHENECTADY FARMER, TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE DISTRICT OF SCHENECTADY
(1788), reprinted in 21 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK, 1402, 1402 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2005).
339. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 53, at 150–51 (Alexander Hamilton).
340. Virginia Convention Debates (June 19, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA 1387, 1392 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare
J. Saladino eds., 1993); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 53, at 150 (“The treaties of
the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land.”).
341. Virginia Convention Debates, supra note 340, at 1392.
342. See MAIER, supra note 8, at 276–79; see also infra notes 363–367 and accompanying
text. Many of these residents lived in Kentucky, which depended on the Ohio River to transport
goods to market. MAIER, supra note 8, at 238, 279. Kentucky remained part of Virginia until it
gained statehood in 1792. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 1-249.
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a delegate to the House of Burgesses from backcountry Virginia,
questioned in print why “treaties should be made the supreme law of
344
the land.” He singled out for attack the treaties made by the
congressional commissioners with “different nations of Savages”
345
since 1776.
[S]ome of them if considered as law, will destroy the private rights of
individuals without an hearing; infringe the sovereignty of States,
are contradictory one with another; and in not a few instances
manifestly unjust. . . . What embarrasments must the Judges of the
fœderal courts be under, when they come to pronounce, what is the
supreme law of the land. They are either to be accessaries to a
multiplicity of wrongs, or endure the imputation of trifling with the
346
obligations of a solemn oath.

Campbell also proposed revisions to the Constitution on behalf of a
nebulous Society of Western Gentlemen, which advocated approval
of treaties by two-thirds of both houses and the removal of treaties
previously “made” by the United States from both the Supremacy
347
Clause and federal judicial jurisdiction. The Society also argued for
348
deleting the Property Clause altogether.
Campbell claimed to speak for a coalition of westerners who
feared that the combination of federal Indian treaties, the Supremacy
Clause, and federal court enforcement would undermine the security
of western land title. These issues reappeared at the Virginia ratifying
convention, at which earlier Indian purchases were, according to
Madison, one of the “principal topics of private discussion & intrigue,
as well as of public declamation,” alongside British debts and
349
navigation of the Mississippi.
Leading Anti-Federalist Patrick

343. See HARTWELL L. QUINN, ARTHUR CAMPBELL: PIONEER AND PATRIOT OF THE “OLD
SOUTHWEST” 124 (1990).
344. Many, Essay, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 18, 1788, reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, at 1638, 1638–39.
345. Id. at 1639.
346. Id.
347. Society of Western Gentlemen, The Federal Constitution Amended: Or, an Essay To
Make It More Comfortable to the Sense of a Majority of the Citizens of the United States, VA.
INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 30 & May 7, 1788, reprinted in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA, 769, 777, 779 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare
J. Saladino eds., 1990).
348. Id. at 778.
349. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (June 13, 1788), in 6 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 329, 329 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1997).
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350

Henry raised this specter of land purchases in a speech on the
federal judiciary; he feared that “citizens . . . who have made large
contracts under our present Government” would later be “called to a
351
Federal Court, and tried under retrospective laws.” “[W]hat is to
352
become of the purchases of the Indians?” he queried pointedly.
“Those unhappy nations who have given up their lands to private
purchasers—who by being made drunk, have given a thousand—nay,
353
I might say 10,000 acres, for the trifling sum of six pence?” Like
Campbell, Henry feared that earlier land transactions would not
withstand careful scrutiny in the new federal courts.
Henry’s Federalist opponents mocked this specter of “Indian
354
purchases” as a “bugbear[] and hobgobling[].” One seized the
opportunity to discourse at length on “the Indian countries,” and
ended by mockingly suggesting that, if Henry did “not like this this
Government, let him go and live among the Indians; I know of several
355
nations that live very happy.” Federalist delegate George Nicholas
noted that, although the Virginia Assembly had already resolved land
companies’ Indian claims, there were nonetheless “Gentlemen who
356
have come by large possessions, that it is not easily to account for.”
357
Henry, an extensive speculator in western lands, viewed this
statement as a thinly veiled jab and interrupted that he hoped
Nicholas “meant nothing personal”; Nicholas replied, “I mean what I
358
say, Sir.” The two delegates bickered until the convention president
instructed the delegates to “not be personal” and cooperate “in a
peaceable manner”; after the two men exchanged halfhearted
359
apologies, the convention moved on.
As this outburst underscored, little of the debate over federal
supremacy over Indian affairs occurred on the high-minded territory
Madison refers here to the “Indiana claim,” a large tract of western land claimed by a purported
Indian sale that had been rejected by the Virginia legislature. Id. at 329 n.2.
350. See generally THOMAS S. KIDD, PATRICK HENRY: FIRST AMONG PATRIOTS 183–211
(2011).
351. Virginia Convention Debates (June 23, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, at 1464, 1466.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1467.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1468.
357. KIDD, supra note 350, at 72.
358. Virginia Convention Debates, June 23, 1788, supra note 351, at 1468.
359. Id. at 1468–69.
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Madison and Yates marked out. Madison’s brief for centralization
gained little traction; proponents of the Constitution subsumed the
issue into the larger question of treaties’ status under the new regime.
The Constitution’s critics shared this perspective, but latched onto
Indian treaties as a compelling argument against granting the national
government the power to make and enforce treaties as the supreme
law of the land. Federalists regarded this objection as mere venality,
but, though significant financial interests were at stake, these
complaints also reflected the widespread commitment to western
expansion that pervaded Anglo-American society. Federalists
appealed to this commitment as well, but they invoked a different set
of concerns.
B. Hamiltonian Ratification
The Federalists recognized that ratification would be a difficult
and hard-fought struggle. The Federalists’ desire for a state with
expanded military and financial powers confronted a powerful
antistatist tradition hostile to centralized authority. But Secretary at
War Henry Knox argued at the close of the Convention that success
would be assured if the “majority of the people . . . reflect[ed]
maturely on their present situation,” and recognized “[t]hat the
gover[n]ment at home is . . . without money & without credit—unable
either to resist the smallest faction within [or] to chastise the
360
despicable bands of murdering savages on the frontiers.”
Knox’s invocation of “murdering savages” to justify a stronger
federal government became a common trope in Federalist arguments
361
for ratification. This rhetoric of savagery gained currency for two
reasons. First, the most effective counterargument to Anti-Federalists
was the seriousness of external threats that required a more powerful
state to meet them. As recent histories have underscored, the
Constitution’s advocates were keenly aware of and anxious about

360. Draft Letter from Henry Knox (Sept. 1787), in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 320, at 26, 27 (third and fourth
alterations in original).
361. Cf. EDLING, supra note 23, at 122 (“The idea that the national government would be
able to develop the West by pacifying the Indian tribes in the Ohio country through war or
treaty was a very common theme in Federalist rhetoric. So, too, was the claim that Britain and
Spain had interests in the American interior and that they supported and stirred up the Indian
nations against American settlers.”)
THE
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362

American status on the international stage. Convinced that the
Articles’ weaknesses had undermined American credibility abroad,
they looked to a strengthened federal government to establish the
363
country as a “respectable nation” in the eyes of the world.
Although focused on European scrutiny, this anxiety extended to
the powerful Native nations on the borderlands watching the failure
of the American experiment. “[I]f we are to be much longer
unblessed with an efficient national government, destitute of funds
and without public credit, either at home or abroad,” New Hampshire
Federalist Nicholas Gilman wrote, “I fear we shall become
364
contemptible even in the eyes of savages themselves.”
A
Pennsylvanian Federalist similarly lamented the nation’s “weak and
shattered government, which brings on us the contempt of every
365
surrounding tribe and the reproach and obloquy of every nation.”
The outward-looking Federalists thus recognized that American
success required impressing Native as well as European nations with
strengthened national power.
The second reason was more cynical. Ratification faced
substantial hurdles in the West, where Anglo-American settlers were
366
well aware that many Federalists despised them as “white Savages.”
They were thus deeply suspicious that a strengthened federal
government designed to ensure rule by a political and cultural elite
367
would privilege eastern interests at their expense. As evidence,
many pointed to the abortive Jay–Gardoqui Treaty of 1786, which
had bargained away rights to navigate the Mississippi River that
westerners, particularly Kentuckians, relied on to export their
362. GOULD, supra note 18, at 130–32; SADOSKY, supra note 18, at 119–47. See generally
Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 18.
363. See MAIER, supra note 8, at ix.
364. Letter from Nicholas Gilman to President John Sullivan (Nov. 7, 1787), in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: DELAWARE, NEW
JERSEY, GEORGIA AND CONNECTICUT 261, 261 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978).
365. Pennsylvania Assembly Proceedings (Sept. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: PENNSYLVANIA 65, 77 (Merrill Jensen
ed., 1976).
366. Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 220, at 599; see SMITHROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 214–16.
367. Saul Cornell, Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism, 76 J.
AM. HIST. 1148, 1156–68 (1990). The long-standing Progressive/neo-Progressive interpretation
of the Constitution argues that these settlers’ fears were well-grounded. For works
representative of this historiographical approach, see BEARD, supra note 306; TERRY BOUTON,
TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007); HOLTON, supra note 300.
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368

goods. The treaty and its seemingly naked betrayal of western
interests gave westerners little confidence that the new government
would benefit them.
But the West was also engulfed in ceaseless cycles of violence
between Indians and white settlers, and Federalists could portray the
strengthened federal government as the savior of Anglo-American
victims of Native violence. Invoking the horrors of Indian attack to
criticize political opponents for their purported complicity was a wellworn tack in early America, one that historians have labeled the
369
“anti-Indian sublime.” Observers at the time recognized this: as
Abraham Yates, Jr. wrote in critiquing the Federalists, “The Dread of
an Indian war, from the Barbarous Manner it is carried on, has ever
been alarming, and as such a great handle for sinister purposes to
370
politicians, both under the former and the present government.”
Thus, though Federalist horror over Indian “cruelties” and
“devastations” was likely sincere, the decision to embrace the rhetoric
of “savagery” also reflected political expediency. Although most
Federalists felt little kinship with backcountry settlers, pandering to
their hatred of Indians provided a compelling argument in a bitter
and divisive political contest.
This strategy meant that the specter of “murdering savages” took
its place among the parade of dangers Federalist delegates routinely
rehearsed at state ratification conventions. At the Pennsylvania
convention, Thomas McKean insisted that only the federal
government was “capable of collecting and directing the national
strength against foreign force, Indian depredations, or domestic

368. See MAIER, supra note 8, at 276–79; Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the
General Good, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 318, at 261, 263–68, 280–83.
369. SILVER, supra note 13, at xx. As Professor Peter Silver notes, the most important use of
the anti-Indian sublime was as “a standard of loyalty . . . nearly always applied to people who
were not Indian at all.” Id. at xxi–xxii. “[M]any of the bitterest arguments between groups came
to depend on tying enemies to Indians,” he argues. Id. at xxii. “The mid-Atlantic’s Indians were
nearly always co-bogeymen: they were seldom discussed as having the initiative to do much
harm apart from the aid, comfort, and direction that they were presumably provided by a
European villain of the moment.” Id. at xxii–xxiii.
370. Lynd, supra note 237, at 241 n.41. Thomas Jefferson later expressed a similar
understanding of the strategic invocations of the Indian threat. See Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Monroe (Apr. 17, 1791), in 20 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MAIN
SERIES 234, 236 (Julian Boyd ed., 1982) (“Every rag of an Indian depredation will . . . serve as a
ground to raise troops with those who think a standing army and a public debt necessary for the
happiness of the U.S. and we shall never be permitted to get rid of either.”).
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371

insurrection.” Robert Livingston saw enemies all around New York
during that state’s debates; to the northwest he feared “the British
372
posts and hostile tribes of savages.” Virginia Governor Edmund
Randolph similarly outlined numerous “point[s] of weakness” to
argue that the new government was “necessary” for the state’s
373
safety. “Cast your eyes to the Western Country,” he urged the
state’s delegates, “that is inhabited by cruel savages, your natural
enemies; besides their natural propensity to barbarity, they may be
excited by the gold of foreign enemies to commit the most horrid
374
ravages on your people.” And in Massachusetts, John Carnes
observed that “the probability of an Indian war, &c. evinced the great
necessity of the establishment of an efficient federal government,
which will be the result of the adoption of the proposed
375
Constitution.” As one Virginian delegate succinctly stated, “Much
has been said on the subject of war by foreigners, and the
376
Indians . . . .”
Anti-Federalists dismissed this rhetoric as mere fear mongering.
Virginian Anti-Federalist delegate William Grayson tired of these
377
“imaginary” and “ludicrous” dangers. “Horrors have been greatly
378
magnified since the rising of the Convention,” he argued. In the
rhetorical world of the Federalists, Barbary pirates would sail up the

371. Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
supra note 365, at 382, 415.
372. New York Convention Debates (June 19, 1788), in 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK 1681, 1685 (John P. Kaminski et al.
eds., 2008) (footnote omitted).
373. Virginia Convention Debates (June 6, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 347, at 970, 977.
374. Id. at 977.
375. Massachusetts Convention Debates (Jan. 15, 1788), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MASSACHUSETTS 1187, 1204–05 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000); see also Harrison Gray Otis Oration (July 4, 1788),
in 18 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
19, at 224, 228 (“[T]he union of the entire strength of the several members, is essential to the
safety and perfection of a political confederacy . . . . Hostile tribes of Indians make daily
incursions upon our frontier, and are supplied by Spaniards and by Englishmen, with the
apparatus of modern war.—Thus the horrours of savage ferocity are increased by the
contribution of civilized malice.”).
376. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 640 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891).
377. Virginia Convention Debates (June 11, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 347, at 1142, 1167.
378. Id.
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
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Chesapeake, South Carolinians “mounted on alligators” would come
“and eat up our little children,” and “[t]he Indians [would] invade us
with numerous armies on our rear, in order to convert our cleared
379
lands into hunting grounds.” Patrick Henry also objected to
Federalists’ claims that “the savage Indians are to destroy us,”
arguing that, in light of superior Anglo-American numbers, “we have
380
nothing to fear from them.”
But Indians were different from alligator-mounted South
Carolinians; Indian war was real. Many agreed with the
pseudonymous writer Agricola that “the recent hostilities of the
savages . . . evince the necessity of a spirited, energetic government, to
381
ward off the calamities of war.” “[S]hould the constitution be
rejected,” one South Carolinian wrote, “how long can we flatter
ourselves to be free from Indian cruelties and depredations . . . if at
this moment warded off from us, ‘tis principally owing to the dread of
an efficacious union of the states by the adoption of the federal
382
constitution.” James Madison echoed these points when he noted
that the “new Govt and that alone” would be able to end British and
Spanish “instigat[ion]” and “encourage[ment]” of the Indians,
“considerations” Madison thought would carry “great weight with
383
men of reflection.”
These views resonated with Anglo-American settlers on the
frontier. Inhabitants of the frontier towns of Schenectady and
Pittsburgh lamented the “weakness of Congress” to prevent British
and Spanish intrigues, on which they blamed “the incursions of the
384
savages.” Pro-Constitution forces in Kentucky welcomed the Fourth
379. Id.
380. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, supra note 376, at 150, 155.
381. P. Valerius Agricola, An Essay, On the Constitution Recommended by the Federal
Convention to the United States, ALBANY GAZETTE, Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in 19 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: NEW YORK, supra
note 334, at 361, 362.
382. Letter to the Publisher, A Steady and Open Republican, ST. GAZETTE OF S.C., May 5,
1788, reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 387, 387 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995).
383. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 18 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at 24,
29.
384. SCHENECTADY FARMER, supra note 338, at 1402; John Gibson, Resolution of the
Inhabitants of Pittsburgh, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE
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of July, 1788, with the toast, “May the Savage enemies of America, be
385
chastised by Arms.”
In short, war with the Indians, far from an imaginary threat, was
a potent reminder of the Articles’ failings. As one French diplomat
observed, “[The] hostilities carried out by the Savages of Ohio
386
support the efforts of Federalists and favor Consolidation.” He
suggested that clever Federalists should instigate more conflicts
387
against “these turbulent neighbors” out of self-interest. “[T]he noise
of guns,” he dryly noted, “would stifle the powerless cries of
388
Democrats [that is, the Anti-Federalists].”
Invoking the Indian threat proved particularly valuable in
389
debates over the creation of a standing army. Republican ideology
regarded standing armies as a prerequisite for tyranny, and so the
Anti-Federalists harped on this provision as evidence of the
390
corruption lurking behind the Constitution.
Many Federalists
countered that standing armies were “essentially necessary” not
because of the threat of “an European war”—“[t]his I think is not
very probable, provided the Fœderal Government is established,”
wrote one Federalist—but because of the “peculiar situation of the
391
United States,” surrounded by Indian nations. The early American
frontier had always been violent. As one commentator noted, because
of Indian wars, Anglo-Americans had not had “six years of peace

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 365, at
286, 286.
385. Lexington Celebrates the Fourth of July, KY. GAZETTE, July 5, 1788, reprinted in 10
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 340,
at 1730, 1731.
386. Letter from Louis-Guillaume Otto to Comte de Montmorin (Aug. 16, 1788), in 18 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at 333,
334.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. See Miller, supra note 9, at 155–56 (“The tribes provided the main justification for the
federal government’s need for armed forces.”).
390. See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 31 (1999).
391. Letter from a Well-Informed Correspondent, to His Friend in this City, on the Subject
of the Proposed Fœderal Constitution, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 177, 180 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988).
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since the first settlement of the country, or shall have for fifty years to
392
come.”
This was a central theme in Federalist Nos. 24 and 25, in which
Alexander Hamilton defended the Constitution’s provision for a
standing army. He acknowledged that a “wide ocean” divided the
country from Europe, but counseled against “an excess of confidence
393
or security.” “The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian
394
nations . . . encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia.” From their
western footholds, the British and Spanish would be constantly
intriguing against the United States. In this struggle, “[t]he savage
tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural
enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us,
395
and most to hope from them.” These threats warranted a national
military under federal authority. At the very least, “there has been a
constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western
396
frontier.” These posts would “continue to be indispensable, if it
397
should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians.”
And the states were inadequate for that task, for they could neither
398
afford nor be trusted with maintaining separate armed forces.
Opponents of ratification balked at these claims. Although some
Anti-Federalists, unlike Grayson and Henry, were willing to concede
399
the threat of Indians, they argued that present arrangements were
adequate to address it. Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists rebutted
Federalist claims that existing forces along the Ohio River
demonstrated “the propriety of a standing army” by insisting that
these soldiers were “a mere occasional armament for the purpose of
392. Marcus IV, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution, Recommended
by the Late Convention at Philadelphia, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J. (Va.), Mar. 12, 1788,
reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 379, 387 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 53, at 165
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that “Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would
always be at hand,” even after ratification).
393. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 53, at 160 (Alexander Hamilton).
394. Id. NO. 25, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton).
395. Id. NO. 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton).
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. NO. 25, at 162–63.
399. See A Democratic Federalist, Essay, PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 365, at
193, 197 (describing the Indians as “inhuman butchers of their species” with whom “we are
always . . . in a state of war”).
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400

restraining divers hostile tribes of savages” and would be disbanded
401
“[a]s soon as the danger is over.” Another Anti-Federalist opined
that it was not “prudent for Congress ever to raise an army merely to
subdue Wabash Indians or any one single tribe. Should there be a
general combination of all the tribes . . . Congress by our present
Articles of Confederation are vested with full powers to draw out the
402
military force of the states.”
The Federalists were less sanguine about the Indian threat and
the adequacy of the Articles to redress it. To counter Anti-Federalist
arguments, they stressed that, even as Indian war threatened, “we are
destitute, of the means of defence, without an army . . . without
money to raise and maintain an armament, and without that credit
403
which might enable us to make use of foreign resources.” The
frontier must be garrisoned, and only Congress could adequately raise
404
forces for this purpose. A writer in the Virginia Chronicle insisted,
in florid prose, on the need “to protect our defenceless frontiers from
indiscriminating cruelties and horrid devastations of the savages, to
405
which, from its extent, it is so peculiarly exposed.” “Let a man
reflect a moment on the promiscuous scenes of carnage committed by
Indians in their midnight excursions,” the author continued, “and he
must have a heart callous indeed, if he would object to an army
406
supported for the benevolent purpose of preventing them.”

400. Centinel II, To the People of Pennsylvania, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787,
reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 457, 463 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981). Prominent Federalist James Wilson had pointed to these forces
in defending standing armies during an influential early speech defending the Constitution. See
James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia, PA. HERALD, Oct. 9, 1787, reprinted
in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at
337, 337–44.
401. A Democratic Federalist, supra note 399, at 197.
402. Letter from Massachusetts, CONN. J., Oct. 17 & 24, 1787, in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION supra note 364, at 373, 378 (emphasis
omitted).
403. Agricola, supra note 381, at 362.
404. See ALBANY FED. COMM., AN IMPARTIAL ADDRESS, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE CITY
AND COUNTY OF ALBANY: OR, THE 35 ANTI-FEDERAL OBJECTIONS REFUTED (1788), reprinted
in 21 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
338, at 1388, 1392–93 (“Our frontiers must be garrisoned in time of peace; and, should Congress
not have power to hire men to do this duty, the militia must be dragged from their families for
the purpose.”).
405. Letter from a Well-Informed Correspondent, to His Friend in this City, on the Subject
of the Proposed Fœderal Constitution, supra note 391, at 180.
406. Id.
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According to Federalists, then, Anti-Federalists’ opposition to a
standing army made them complicit in the inhumane violence of the
“savages” on the frontier.
The dominance of Federalist arguments based on Indians’
purported savagery demonstrates how ratification—which was, at
base, a populist political campaign rather than a high-minded
exposition of constitutional theory—shaped constitutional meaning.
Hamilton, Randolph, and other, lesser-known Federalists who
invoked the terrors of Indian war likely also shared Madison’s views
that the abuses of expansionist states and squatters were equally to
407
blame for frontier violence. Yet they were also seasoned politicians
who recognized the potency of anti-Indian rhetoric in early America,
and so carefully selected their arguments in selling the Constitution.
Unlike the speculative horrors of European invasion or internecine
violence among the states—which ratification’s opponents easily
mocked—Indian warfare was happening even as ratification was
debated. Anti-Federalist attempts to downplay the Indian threat thus
rang hollow, a fact Federalists recognized and exploited by portraying
their opponents as complicit in Indian violence.
The Federalists’ choices had consequences. Their approach
abandoned any consideration of the causes of Indian violence, instead
depicting Natives as perpetual enemies of the United States who
would always be aggressors on the frontier. This narrative of AngloAmerican victimization provided a powerful justification for western
expansion. The rhetoric also had political effects. Many were
seemingly unpersuaded by Federalist invocations of the Indian threat:
western Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and North Carolina remained
408
largely and stubbornly anti-Federalist.
But several prominent

407. Hamilton, for instance, would later urge federal supremacy and diplomacy with Indian
nations to the Governor of Georgia. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Mathews
(Sept. 25, 1794), in 17 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 270, 272–75 (Harold Syrett ed.,
1972). And both Randolph and Hamilton became prominent members of the Washington
administration, which adopted an Indian policy focused on restraining frontier settlers where
possible. See NICHOLS, supra note 8, 98–202 (describing the Federalists’ vision that “[o]n the
Trans-Appalachian frontier, officials would use courts, armies, and regulated land sales to curb
white frontiersmen’s appetite for Indian land and Indian blood”).
408. See Terry Bouton, The New and (Somewhat) Improved Frontier Thesis, 35 REVS. AM.
HIST. 490, 493–94 (2007) (reviewing GRIFFIN, supra note 35); Cornell, supra note 367, at 1149–
50. Professor Patrick Griffin challenges the association between westerners and AntiFederalism claimed by Professors Terry Bouton and Saul Cornell, arguing that “[g]iven the
conditions with which they struggled, westerners tended to view broader issues that affected
them and all Americans, such as the debate over the Constitution, through the all-encompassing
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backcountry representatives—including William Blount, the one-time
opponent of the Treaties of Hopewell—cast their lot with the new
409
government. And in one instance, the Federalists’ self-serving
rhetoric succeeded, perhaps too well, and became an important part
of the Constitution’s meaning for expansionist states.
C. The Lesser of Two Evils: Ratification in Georgia
Georgia was an unlikely place to support ratification. Delegates
to the Continental Congress regarded it as such an
“unworthy . . . State . . . that had not taken a single foderal measure”
that they “very seriously talked of” voting the state “out of the
410
Union” altogether. Abraham Baldwin, one of the state’s delegates
at the Convention, observed that Georgia had little to gain from any
411
new government.
North Carolina, demographically and
economically similar to Georgia and one of the last states to consider
the Constitution, initially rejected adoption by a margin of over two
412
to one. Yet Georgia not only ratified but did so unanimously, only
three months after the end of the Convention. This sudden and
dramatic conversion in favor of federal power was due largely to the
413
threat of Indian war.

lens of protection. . . . [T]he terms ‘anti-federalist’ and ‘federalist,’ as they are conventionally
understood, made little sense for the West.” GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 195–96.
409. Andrew R.L. Cayton, “Separate Interests” and the Nation-State: The Washington
Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West, 79 J. AM. HIST.
39, 58–59 (1992).
410. Letter from William Houstoun to Samuel Elbert (Apr. 2, 1785), in 22 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 142, at 300, 301; see also MAIER, supra note
8, at 123 (“The state’s strong consent to the Constitution stands in stark contrast to its previous
disregard for the Confederation: Its delegates to Congress were notable mainly for their absence
from its sessions, and Georgia never paid even the relatively small requisitions Congress levied
on it.”).
411. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 372
(“That State [Georgia] has always hitherto supposed a Genl Govermt to be the pursuit of the
central States who wished to have a vortex for every thing — that her distance would preclude
her from equal advantage — & that she could not prudently purchase it by yielding national
powers.”).
412. See MAIER, supra note 8, at 422; see also NICHOLS, supra 8, at 95 (arguing that “if
Georgians had not faced an emergency,” the state might “have taken the same course” as North
Carolina and rejected the Constitution). North Carolina did not refuse to ratify altogether, but
demanded a bill of rights and a new constitutional convention before it would ratify. MAIER,
supra note 8, at 421.
413. For discussion of historians’ debates over Georgia’s motivations to ratify, see infra note
425.
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By the time Georgians began debating ratification, the state’s
governor was convinced that war with the Creeks was
414
“unavoidable.” The state, the governor lamented, was woefully
415
unprepared. The Creeks could field an estimated six thousand
416
riflemen, well supplied with ammunition by the Spanish. By
contrast, the Georgians, hobbled with a rapidly depreciating paper
417
currency, struggled to recruit soldiers. The state assembly called for
418
three thousand troops, but could not afford to arm them.
Acknowledging that the “aid of the Union will be required,” Georgia
419
appealed to the national government it had earlier spurned.
Like the legislature, elite Georgians turned to the stronger
government proposed in the Constitution as their potential savior.
Baldwin believed war would hasten resolution of “the great political
420
question” of ratification. Joseph Clay, an influential Savannah
merchant, wrote:
We have too much reason to apprehend we are involved in a general
Indian war. Many have been killed on both sides. Should it continue
it must be attended with the most ruinous consequences to this
state. . . . The new plan of government for the Union I think will be
adopted with us readily; the powers are great, but of two evils we
must chose the least. Under such a government we should have
421
avoided this great evil, an Indian war.

414. Letter from Governor George Mathews to the Speaker of the Assembly (Oct. 18,
1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 364, at 225, 226.
415. Id.
416. Letter from James White to Thomas Pinckney (May 24, 1787), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 20, 21.
417. Id.; see also Letter from Governor George Mathews to the Speaker of the Assembly,
supra note 414, at 225 (“The want of public faith is so fully shown from the depreciation of our
currency . . . .”).
418. Letter from Governor George Mathews (Nov. 15, 1787), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 23, 23.
419. Id.; see also Letter from Governor George Mathews to William Pierce (Oct. 16, 1787),
in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
364, at 224, 224 (reporting that Matthews, Governor of Georgia, had written to Knox for “arms
and military stores” because the state was “engaged in a war without the means requisite to
prosecute it”).
420. Letter from Abraham Baldwin to Nicholas Gilman (Dec. 20, 1787), in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at
262, 262.
421. Letter from Joseph Clay to John Pierce (Oct. 17, 1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 232, 232; see also
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Outside commentators agreed that calamity would convert the
Georgians into acolytes of federal power. George Washington
believed Georgia’s precarious situation assured ratification: “[I]f a
weak state, with powerful tribes of Indians in its rear and the
Spaniards on its flank, do not incline to embrace a strong general
government, there must, I should think, be either wickedness or
422
insanity in their conduct.” A visiting French diplomat observed,
“The troubles that Georgia has to fear from the restless nature and
ferocity of these Savages will make it fervently desire the
423
establishment of a more effective Government.”
These predictions proved right. Georgia became the fourth state
to ratify when its convention unanimously endorsed the Constitution
on December 31, 1787, after merely three days of discussion. One
delegate speculated that the convention refrained from ratifying the
424
first day only to avoid appearing overhasty.
Scholars have debated whether Georgia’s easy ratification should
be attributed to the looming Indian war, as the evidence would seem
425
to suggest. For Georgians, the answer was clear. Three years after
ratification, the Georgia House of Representatives wrote:

Letter from Joseph Clay to John Williams (Nov. 13, 1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 234, 234 (“The want of
sufficient energy in our government generally is also no small evil, which (at least a large part
of) the considerate part of our community hope the new federal system, if adopted, will in part
remove.”).
422. Letter from George Washington to Samuel Powel (Jan. 18, 1788), in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at
263, 263; see also Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox (Jan. 10, 1788), in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at
263, 263 (“[I]n the situation Georgia is, nothing but insanity, or a desire of becoming the allies of
the Spaniards or savages, can disincline them to a government which holds out the prospect of
relief from its present distresses.”).
423. Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 5, 1788), in 18 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at 151,
152. Even the Anti-Federalist William Grayson, contradicting his later sarcastic comments at
the Virginia convention, conceded that Georgian ratification was “highly probable as [Georgia]
is at present very much embarrassed with an Indian war, and in great distress.” Letter from
William Grayson to William Short (Nov. 10, 1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at 262, 262.
424. Letter from Joseph Habersham to John Habersham (Dec. 29, 1787), in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at
272, 272–73.
425. Compare Edward J. Cashin, Georgia: Searching for Security, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 318, at 93, 111–12 (“In his own way, the Creek chieftain Alexander
McGillivray may well have been the most important promoter of the cause of the Constitution
in Georgia.”), and Albert B. Saye, Georgia: Security Through Union, in THE CONSTITUTION
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Exposed to the depredations of the Indians, and suffering under
many other inconveniences from being a frontier state, it was the
policy of Georgia at an early period to adopt the foederal
Government—And we not only find her among the foremost, but
Unanimous in acceeding to the Confederation anticipating those
advantages which would naturally be derived from an efficient
426
General Government . . . .

Georgia representative James Jackson echoed these sentiments when,
demanding federal assistance against the Creeks, he informed
Congress that, “[i]n full confidence that a good, complete, and
efficient Government would succor and relieve them, [the Georgians]
were led to an early and unanimous adoption of the Constitution
427
under which we deliberate.” For Georgians, then, arguments about
the Indian threat were more than rhetorical hobgoblins, as AntiFederalists claimed. As Georgia reaped what it had sown, Creek
power and state weakness transformed it from a stubborn opponent
of Congress into one of the “foremost” proponents of a strengthened
federal government.
Georgia’s decision had important national consequences.
428
Ratification, which required nine votes, was hard fought and highly
contingent. Proponents and critics alike knew how much rested on
events in other states, which they followed closely: one common
image represented the states as a series of domino-like pillars
429
reflecting the progress of ratification. Georgia’s early ratification
built momentum. If Georgia had followed North Carolina’s lead and
refused to ratify the Constitution as written, the results would have
been unpredictable, particularly for two crucial states—Virginia and
STATES 77, 80 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1988) (“In essence,
Georgia wanted a stronger central government to assist the states . . . against the Indians . . . .”),
with MAIER, supra note 8, at 124 (questioning whether “Georgia ratif[ied] because it
desperately needed federal help in fighting attacks by Creek Indians”). The most nuanced
discussion of Georgia’s decision to ratify notes that Georgians likely ratified because they were
anxious to secure federal military support, but did not thereby endorse federal supremacy over
Indian affairs. See Introduction to The Ratification of the Constitution by Georgia, in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at
201, 210–11.
426. Letter from the Georgia House of Representatives to Governor Edward Telfair (June
10, 1790), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 364, microfilm supp. no. 59, doc. 50, at 178, 179.
427. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 696 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Jackson).
428. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
429. Robert L. Alexander, The Grand Federal Edifice, 9 DOCUMENTARY EDITING, June
1987, at 13, 13–17.
AND THE
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430

New York—that held late conventions. In both states, the weight of
prior ratifications played a critical role in securing approval;
nonetheless, in both states, the vote in favor of ratification was
431
extremely close. Absent Georgia’s ratification, Anti-Federalists’
arguments to condition ratification on a second constitutional
convention to adopt proposed amendments would have had a much
432
better chance for success.
Georgian ratification also demonstrated the effect of the
Federalists’ arguments. By emphasizing the power of the federal
government to counter the Indian threat and downplaying federal
supremacy over Indian affairs, the Federalists secured ratification by
offering the Georgians all carrot and no stick. As one French
diplomat wrote, “Attacked by Indians, it was in [Georgia’s] interest to
appear federally inclined in order to obtain help from the present
Union. But if Georgia preceded the other Southern States in the
adoption of the new Constitution, it can hardly be expected from
433
eagerness to execute it.” Ratification on these terms meant that
Georgia’s support for the federal government extended only as far as
self-interest dictated.
D. Ratification as Compact and Its Legacy
Many western settlers, particularly south of the Ohio River,
shared Georgia’s attitude toward the newly created federal
government. They viewed the national state instrumentally: they were
willing to offer loyalty and obedience as long as the government
434
fulfilled what they considered its most basic function of protection.
And although some settlers had flirted with secession or alliance with
Spain, the strengthened federal government was the region’s most

430. MAIER, supra note 8, at 255–319, 342–97.
431. In Virginia, the vote was eighty-nine to seventy-nine. Id. at 305. In New York, it was
even closer; the vote to ratify was thirty to twenty-seven, id. at 396, while the effort to condition
ratification on a later convention failed by two votes. Id. at 393.
432. This effort retained considerable force even after defeats in New York and Virginia,
especially when North Carolina refused to ratify. Id. at 425–29.
433. Letter from G.J.A. Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at
283, 283.
434. See GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 166 (“[O]ne idea that ran through all emerging facets of
a popular frontier commonwealth vision and lent them all meaning was the hatred of Indians.”);
id. at 174 (“If government failed to protect and, just as significant, failed to decimate Indians—
the form that people insisted sovereignty had to take—the people owed no obedience.”).
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435

promising guardian. Many backcountry leaders, then, supported the
new Constitution based on the self-interested calculation that the new
federal government would fulfill the Federalists’ promises and defend
436
them against “murdering savages.”
This strain of thinking, in short, interpreted ratification as quid
pro quo: allegiance in return for military support to eradicate the
437
Indian threat. Soon after George Washington was sworn in as
president, appeals arrived from western settlers professing their
loyalty, decrying state protection as insufficient, and “implor[ing]” the
federal government to send “an army . . . into the heart of [Indian]
438
Country Sufficient to extirpate their whole Savage race.” Georgia
had similar expectations. One congressional delegate sardonically

435. See Cayton, supra note 409, at 58 (“The great advantage of the federal Union
established by the Constitution of 1787 was that it was the most promising candidate to
accomplish those goals [of securing protection]. Clearly, North Carolina was not up to the task;
neither was Georgia.”).
436. See id. at 59 (noting that backcountry leaders “became federalists . . . not because they
were deeply attached to the Union, not because they had a profound commitment to strong
government . . . but because, simply put, their interest in finding a protector had intersected with
the emergence of a (theoretically) more powerful American government”). On the trope of
“murdering savages,” see supra Part III.B.
437. Cf. GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 241–44 (describing the creation of the Revolution
settlement in the West as a Hobbesian “covenant to create commonwealth” in which “Indian
hatred . . . became a lasting foundation of the nation”).
438. Letter from the Citizens of Mero District, North Carolina, to George Washington
(Nov. 30, 1789), in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 345, 347
(W.W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1993); see also id. at 346 (decrying that the citizens of the
Mero District—located in present-day central Tennessee—lacked “the most distant prospect of
any further assistance from the legislative body of the State” to protect against Indian attacks);
Letter from Harrison County, Va., Field Officers to George Washington (Feb. 2, 1790), in 5
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, at 93, 94 (Dorothy Twohig,
Mark A. Mastromarino & Jack D. Warren eds., 1996) (“[I]n the name and behalf of our
Suffering fellow Citizens over whome we preside as field Officers of the militia, [we] pray that
Your Excellency would take our distressed Situation under your Parential Care and grant us
Such Releife as you in your Wisdom shall think proper . . . .”); Letter from the Officers of the
Mero District (Aug. 1, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL
SERIES, at 397, 397 (Dorothy Twohig & Mark A. Mastromarino eds., 1999) (“We implore Your
interposition, fully hoping to meet with a more ample Protection than we have hertofore receivd
from the State of North Carolina—the expectation of which was a Powerful incentive inducing
us to use Our utmost influence to obtain the Act of Cession.”); Letter from the Representatives
of Monongahela, Harrison, and Randolph Counties, Virginia, to George Washington (Dec. 12,
1789), in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra, at 397, 397–
98 (“beg[ging]” that defensive measures “be continued in our country until it may be thought
necessary to carry on offensive war into the enemy’s country as to bring about a lasting peace,”
and asking President Washington to “suffer us further to assure you, that we, on the behalf of
our bleeding country look up to you, and to you only, for that assistance that our necessities
require”).
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observed, “[A]ltho the USA have already expended as much to
defend Georgia, as the whole State upon a fair valuation would sell
for, She . . . expects the USA go on conquering, more Indian Lands
439
for her emolument.”
In one sense, Georgia’s strategic ratification worked. “[T]he new
government,” Creek leader Alexander McGillivray reported, “is
established on a basis which renders it capable of making war on us in
440
a fashion that would assure them a complete success.” Rather than
confront this strengthened federal military, McGillivray opted to
441
negotiate. The resulting Treaty of New York, the first treaty ratified
442
under the new Constitution, promised an end to hostilities.
But by invalidating several state purchases and guaranteeing
443
Creek lands, the treaty outraged the Georgians, who regarded the
Washington administration’s decision to negotiate with rather than
fight the Creeks as a betrayal of their understanding of ratification as
a reciprocal bargain. Infuriated Georgians turned on the federal
government they had recently supported; hostile newspaper articles
questioned whether the administration had breached the “compact
which makes Georgia a part of the Union,” thereby releasing the
444
state from its obligations.
For the next forty years, Georgia fought the federal government
for control over Indian affairs. “[T]he United States are at peace with
all the world except the state of Georgia,” Washington reportedly
445
exclaimed in the face of such intransigence. In flagrant violation of
446
federal treaties, statutes, and, in Thomas Jefferson’s opinion, the
439. Letter from Samuel A. Otis to James Warren (Feb. 6, 1788), in 24 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, supra note 158, at 636, 636–37.
440. Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Carlos Howard (Aug. 11, 1790), in CAUGHEY,
supra note 166, at 274.
441. See id. (“These motives have led me to agree to . . . articles of peace to end our
disputes.” (footnote omitted)).
442. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35, 36 [hereinafter
Treaty of New York]; see NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 121–24.
443. Treaty of New York, supra note 442, arts. IV–V.
444. David A. Nichols, Land, Republicanism, and Indians: Power and Policy in Early
National Georgia, 1780–1825, 85 GA. HIST. Q. 199, 216 (2001); see also Cayton, supra note 409,
at 61–64 (explaining southern disillusionment in federal power after the failure to commit
military forces to the South).
445. Introduction to The Ratification of the Constitution by Georgia, supra note 425, at 211
(quoting Marius, Editorial, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Dec. 24, 1791).
446. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, enacted by the First Congress, prohibited the
sale of Indian lands “unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty,
held under the authority of the United States.” Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 138.
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447

provisions of the Constitution, the state sold speculators land
448
guaranteed to the Creeks and Cherokees.
Subsequent treaty
negotiations replayed earlier farces at Fort Stanwix and Hopewell,
449
with open hostility between federal and Georgian commissioners.
One informant wrote Washington that frontier Georgians “now
consider the troops and servants of the United States . . . nearly as
great Enemies as they do the Indians and for no other reason than
that they recommend moderation and a compliance with the laws of
450
the land.” In 1802, Georgia became the last state to cede its lands to
the national government, in return for a federal promise to extinguish
451
Indian title as quickly as possible. But the federal government did
not act quickly enough to satisfy the Georgians, who resumed open
defiance of federal treaties; in the 1820s, the state’s governor even
mobilized the militia to forestall a federal threat to use the army to
452
enforce a federal Indian treaty.
This struggle culminated with Indian removal and Chief Justice
453
John Marshall’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia, where the
Supreme Court invalidated the state’s unilateral effort to assert
454
jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation. Marshall read the war
447. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Certain Georgia Land Grants (May 3, 1790), in 16 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MAIN SERIES 406, 407 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961) (arguing that
Georgia’s land grants were invalid because “[t]he[] paragraphs of the Constitution, declaring
that the general government shall have, and that the particular ones shall not have, the rights of
war and treaty, are so explicit that no commentary can explain them further, nor can any explain
them away”); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox (Aug. 10, 1791), in 7 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 226, 226–27 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (“[N]either
under the present constitution, nor the ancient confederation, had any State or person a right to
treat with the Indians, without the consent of the General Government . . . .”).
448. MAGRATH, supra note 17, at 2–6.
449. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at 590–94; see also
SADOSKY, supra note 18, at 171 (“Within hours of their coming into contact with one another,
agents of the state of Georgia and the federal government were engaged in a vitriolic
correspondence about Indian treaty protocols. . . . [T]he key question was, ‘Who is in charge?’
The Federalists believed that the Constitution gave one answer (the federal government), but
Georgia could, and did, claim that they retained a role in the treaty-making process.”).
450. Letter from James Seagrove to George Washington (July 27, 1792), in 10 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 577, 578 (Philander D. Chase, Robert F.
Haggard & Mark A. Mastromarino eds., 2002).
451. Act of Apr. 24, 1802, No. 35, 1802 Ga. Laws 48; see FORD, supra note 17, at 25;
MAGRATH, supra note 17, at 34–36.
452. See ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS, GEORGIA AND STATES RIGHTS: A STUDY OF THE
POLITICAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR, WITH
PARTICULAR REGARD TO FEDERAL RELATIONS 15–86 (1902).
453. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
454. Id. at 561–63.
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power, the treaty power, and the Indian Commerce Clause to create
455
exclusive federal authority over Indian affairs. The ruling went
famously unenforced, as President Andrew Jackson implicitly
456
endorsed Georgia’s refusal to comply with the Court’s decision. But
the crisis represented more than the rejection of the rule of law or the
457
judicial supremacy of the Supreme Court, as it is usually read. It was
a clash between two divergent constitutional strains of thought.
Marshall embraced the Madisonian emphasis on federal supremacy
and restraint, but the Georgians, as well as many southern state
supreme courts, could justly point to an alternate constitutional
458
tradition committed to expansion and dispossessing Indians.
Notwithstanding the cries of Whigs and later commentators, their
455. Id. at 558–60. In the decision, Marshall delved into the history of Indian affairs under
Article IX of the Articles, noting that its “ambiguous phrases . . . were so construed by the states
of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the power itself.” Id. at 559. But, Marshall continued,
the correct construction of Article IX was not before the Court because of the “adoption of our
existing constitution.” Id. “That instrument,” he wrote,
confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of
regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our
intercourse with the Indians. . . . The shackles imposed on this power, in the
confederation, are discarded.
Id. Marshall thus adopted Madison’s reading that the shift in language from the Articles was
intended to grant exclusive power over Indian affairs.
456. See NORGREN, supra note 17, at 122–30. See generally Anton-Hermann Chroust, Did
President Andrew Jackson Actually Threaten the Supreme Court of the United States with
Nonenforcement of Its Injunction Against the State of Georgia?, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 76 (1960).
457. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 22–
31, 66–67, 71 (2010) (describing Worcester as exemplifying the limits of Supreme Court power);
DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 4 (2007) (arguing, in the context of the Cherokee cases and Indian
removal, that “[t]he rule of law obtained only in places and on subjects where local majorities
supported it”); KRAMER, supra note 26, at 182–83 (interpreting the Cherokee cases in the
context of contests over the judicial supremacy of the Supreme Court).
458. See generally TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE
SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS (2002)
(tracing three southern supreme court decisions rejecting Worcester and arguing that they “did
not change the law” but “reflected the majority view of American lawyers and legislators and,
indeed, the white American public, and that view was that the tribes were not sovereign
nations”). Marshall himself had arguably endorsed the expansionist states’ reading when he
concluded that Indians’ right of occupancy did not preclude the sale of underlying title. See
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603 (1823); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87, 146 (1810). This position conflicted with the Washington administration’s earlier
interpretation that grants of Indian land guaranteed by federal treaties were unconstitutional.
See supra note 447; see also BANNER, supra note 35, at 150 (“In the early 1790s, American
lawyers and government officials considered the Indians the owners of their land. By 1823,
however . . . the United States Supreme Court declared . . . that the Indians were in fact not the
owners of the land but had merely a ‘right of occupancy.’”).
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resistance to the Court was not simple lawlessness. Instead, they
insisted on the sanctity of the bargain they believed ratification
represented. Indian removal, Jackson informed Congress in 1830, was
“a duty which this Government owes” the states, as it “was
substantially a part of the compact which made them members of our
460
confederacy.” In the end, this interpretation prevailed and the
Indians were removed. In the antebellum United States, it proved to
be the Georgians, not Marshall, who determined what the
461
Constitution meant.
IV. LEGACIES AND IMPLICATIONS
Soon after ratification, word of the new Constitution spread
throughout Indian country. “Our Union, which was a child, is grown

459. An increasing body of literature has challenged the elite depiction of backcountry
settlers as merely “lawless,” and focused on their construction of “quasi-legal” norms, often at
odds with state-constructed legal orders. See, e.g., HULSEBOSCH, supra note 8, at 101–04;
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 55–76. Professor Lisa Ford offers a particularly insightful discussion
of “legality and lawlessness” on the Georgia frontier. FORD, supra note 17, at 85–107. As she
notes, “Settler violence . . . was clothed in law—a law which, in important respects, settlers
constituted and controlled. . . . [S]ettlers used their control of legal discourse, legal evidence,
and juries to ensure that common law served the interests of plurality in early Georgia . . . .” Id.
at 85–86. For the most influential statement on the meanings of “law” within a pluralist system
with competing sources of authority, see generally Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 899.
460. 7 REG. DEB. app. at x (1830).
461. Cf. FORD, supra note 17, at 195 (“The juridical solution to Georgia’s sovereignty
problems lay not in the Supreme Court’s pallid defense of Indian sovereignty and
jurisdiction . . . but in the legislatures and the courts of the South . . . [which created] a powerful,
efficacious and new practice of sovereignty that harried the Cherokee over the
Mississippi . . . .”). Long after what Ford terms “perfect settler sovereignty,” id. at 183, had been
established over the trans-Appalachian West—after, that is, the federal government had largely
dispossessed and removed the region’s Natives—Marshall was arguably vindicated, as
Worcester’s “broad principles . . . came to be accepted as law.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
219 (1959). Indeed, Whigs-cum-Republicans cited Worcester to justify the reshaping of
federalism in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Magliocca, supra note 17, at 929–37. Now,
however, the case’s canonical status is often honored largely in the breach. See Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (observing while citing Worcester that “it was ‘long ago’ that ‘the Court
departed from Chief Justice Marshall’s view that “the laws of [a State] can have no force” within
reservation boundaries’” (alteration in original) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980))); Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 257 (1992) (noting, in discussing Worcester, that “[t]he
‘platonic notions of Indian sovereignty’ that guided Chief Justice Marshall have, over time, lost
their independent sway” (quoting McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
(1973))); see also Frickey, supra note 11, at 418–26 (arguing that the Supreme Court has “moved
away from Chief Justice Marshall’s model [in Worcester] in dramatic fashion”).
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up to manhood,” federal commissioners told the Creeks. Now that
“[o]ne great council is established, with full powers to promote the
public good,” the United States would ensure “justice” for the Native
463
nations within its borders. The Indians took them at their word.
“We rejoice much to hear that the great Congress have got new
powers, and have become strong,” the Cherokees wrote the new
464
federal government. “We now hope that whatever is done hereafter
by the great council will no more be destroyed and made small by any
465
State.” The Six Nations expressed similar sentiments in a letter to
466
George Washington ; when New York emissaries demanded yet
another land cession, Iroquois leaders waved copies of the federal
467
statute barring state purchases of Indian lands in front of them.
The sale happened anyway, a recurring pattern that quickly
468
dashed Native hopes for the new government. Federal officials
spoke the Madisonian language of paternalism, but their efforts at
469
restraint were halfhearted and ineffectual. Georgia’s defiance of
federal authority was especially brazen, but not unique: many states
claimed and exercised a constitutional right to govern Indians until
470
well after the Civil War. By contrast, the Hamiltonian Constitution
462. Abortive Negotiations at Rock Landing (Sept. 1789), in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 547, 550.
463. Id.
464. Letter from Representatives of the Cherokee Nation to George Washington, President
of the U.S. (May 19, 1787), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 190, at
56, 57.
465. Id.
466. Letter from the Five Nations at Buffalo Creek to George Washington (June 2, 1789), in
18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 517, 517.
467. See TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 231–34, 302–07.
468. Id.
469. This is the dominant theme in the works of Father Francis Paul Prucha, whose twovolume study on federal Indian policy remains foundational. See generally FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN
INDIANS (1984). Prucha argues that federal officials “sought to treat the Indians honorably,
even though they acted within a set of circumstances that rested on the premise that white
society would prevail. The best term for this persistent attitude is paternalism . . . .” 1 id. at
xxviii.
470. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 4, 1791), in 8
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 438, at 57, 58
(complaining in the context of Indian affairs that “the States individually are omitting no
occasion to interfere in matters which belong to the general Government,” and that “the
interferences of States, and the speculations of Individuals will be the bane of all our public
measures”); see also GARRISON, supra note 458, at 103–24, 151–68, 198–247; LAURENCE M.
HAUPTMAN, CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS: IROQUOIS DISPOSSESSION AND THE RISE OF NEW
YORK STATE 61–64, 209–12 (1999); DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE
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functioned as the Federalists had promised. Indians turned out to be
the substantial threat they invoked: the first military expeditions
against the western Indian confederacy, in 1790 and 1791, suffered the
worst defeat “Indians ever inflicted on the U.S. Army in its entire
471
history.” But, after tripling the size of its army and spending $5
472
million—five-sixths of all federal expenditures from 1790 to 1796 —
the United States ultimately prevailed, seizing most of present-day
473
Ohio. War between the United States and Native nations remained
a near constant for the next century, but the outcome was never again
474
so close. The fiscal-military state the Constitution created proved its
most enduring legacy in Indian country, and made Natives among the
475
biggest losers of ratification.
This is not to suggest that Native dispossession was the simple
result of federal military conquest. Just as significant as federal
financial and military support for expansion was the entrenchment of
a militaristic paradigm that cast Anglo-American settlers as victims
and force against “savages” as both justified and necessary. Although
Madisonians had hoped the new government would keep “both
[whites and Natives] in awe by a strong hand, and compel them to be
moderate and just,” in practice the constitutional structures of
popular sovereignty and federalism ensured that the federal
LAW: SOVEREIGNTY, RACE, AND CITIZENSHIP, 1790–1880, at 51–79 (2007); TAYLOR, supra
note 114, at 231–34, 302–07. See generally Cynthia Cumfer, Local Origins of National Indian
Policy: Cherokee and Tennessean Ideas About Sovereignty and Nationhood, 1790–1811, 23 J.
EARLY REPUBLIC 21 (2003).
471. WOOD, supra note 16, at 130. Other accounts of the war may be found in HORSMAN,
supra note 12, at 84–95; RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE
CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783–1802, at 91–127 (1975);
WHITE, supra note 1, at 454–55 (1991).
472. TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 238. See generally Gerard Clarfield, Protecting the
Frontiers: Defense Policy and the Tariff Question in the First Washington Administration, 32
WM. & MARY Q. 443 (1975) (describing the vituperative political battles over the financing of
the Northwest Indian Confederacy War). I am indebted to Andrew Fagal for bringing the
Clarfield citation to my attention.
473. WOOD, supra note 16, at 130–31.
474. R. DOUGLAS HURT, THE INDIAN FRONTIER, 1763–1846, at 103–36, 164–88 (2002).
475. See, e.g. EDLING, supra note 23, at 140 (“The army had been brought into existence to
deal with western expansion and to coerce the Indians.”); ERIC HINDERAKER, ELUSIVE
EMPIRES: CONSTRUCTING COLONIALISM IN THE OHIO VALLEY, 1673–1800, at 226 (1997) (“In
the end, national leaders and western settlers established a complicated pattern of mutual
support, which served as the foundation for a new relationship between state and society in the
west—one that sapped, with remarkable speed, Native American autonomy and power.”);
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 199 (“[T]he federal government, which [Henry] Knox had hoped
would shield the Indians from the ill effects of American expansion, was instead becoming the
foremost agent of their dispossession and removal.”).
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government’s “legal coercive power” ran largely one way. The
specter of the “sword of the Republic” undergirded all laws and
treaties regulating Native interactions with the United States, often
477
obviating actual bloodshed.
Through this alchemy, “lawless”
violence was refined into the purer stuff of constitutional liberty and
478
order.
This postratification history of Indian affairs was neither
inevitable nor accidental; it was, in a certain sense, the deliberate
choice of the Constitution’s proponents. Though the Madisonians
should not be anachronistically valorized as racial egalitarians—their
paternalism reflected their own imperialist aims and disdain for
479
Natives —they were sincerely committed to using the new
government to secure Indians what they repeatedly termed justice.
But the Federalists, though they likely shared Madison’s
humanitarian impulses, nonetheless prioritized the heightened power
of the United States to control the borderlands and defeat Native
nations when selling the Constitution’s virtues. Their implicit bargain
helped ensure that, instead of checking expansionist states and
settlers, the federal government proved their valuable ally,
engendering a perverse form of cooperative federalism at Natives’
480
expense. As French observer Alexis de Tocqueville perceptively
noted in the era of Indian removal,
The Union treats the Indians with less cupidity and violence than
the several States, but the two governments are alike deficient in

476. Report of the Secretary at War to Congress, supra note 209, at 31–32.
477. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (July 7, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, at 134, 136 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989).
478. See Paul Frymer, Building an American Empire: Territorial Expansion in the
Antebellum Era, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 913, 917–19 (2011) (stressing the importance of nonmilitary exercises of federal power in facilitating western expansion, particularly through “the
legitimating power of law”); cf. HULSEBOSCH, supra note 8, at 11 (“[Americans] conquered the
continent less with violence than with the confidence with which they carried forward their
notions of constitutional liberty.”). For a thoughtful consideration of violence in Native
experiences of imperialism, see generally NED BLACKHAWK, VIOLENCE OVER THE LAND:
INDIANS AND EMPIRES IN THE EARLY AMERICAN WEST (2006).
479. Subsequent events also proved that paternalism and exclusive federal power did not
necessarily lead to more humane or just outcomes for Natives. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 35,
at 258–92 (depicting the harms caused by allotment). See generally FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A
FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880–1920 (1984) (describing
the deleterious effects of the federal government’s paternalist assimilation campaign).
480. See ROSEN, supra note 470, at 78–79 (“The common goal of the state and federal
governments with regard to Indians was control of Indians and Indian lands. . . . [T]hey acted in
tandem to achieve that goal.”).
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good faith. . . . [T]he tyranny of the States obliges the savages to
retire; the Union, by its promises and resources, facilitates their
481
retreat; and these measures tend to precisely the same end.

The history presented here revises some of our understandings of
the Constitution. For certain constitutional provisions, the context of
Indian affairs is critical. As this Article has demonstrated, relations
with Indians were a central site for early debates over federalism.
Moreover, works that purport to expound the original understanding
of the treaty or war power—without acknowledging that in its first
decade the federal government entered six “foreign” and eleven
482
Indian treaties, or that the U.S. Army fought two “foreign” and at
483
least ten Indian wars before the Civil War —present a partial
484
perspective. As one example, some scholars have argued that the
drafters of the Constitution anticipated that “treaties that sought to
have a domestic, legislative effect” would require subsequent
485
legislative enactment. But this conclusion is difficult to reconcile
with the reality that Indian treaties—perhaps the paradigmatic
instance of treaties having domestic legislative effects, as resistance

481. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 452–53 (Francis Bowen ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., N.Y., The Century Co. 1898) (1835).
482. This includes treaties from 1789 through 1799; single treaties concluded with multiple
Indian nations were each counted as only one treaty. If each agreement with a separate Indian
nation is considered a distinct treaty, then the number of treaties concluded with Indian nations
in the decade rises to thirty-one. Compare 7 Stat. 28–62 (recording treaties with Indian nations),
with 8 Stat. 116–177 (recording treaties with “foreign” nations).
483. The two “foreign” wars were the War of 1812 and the Mexican–American War, both of
which also involved fighting with Indian nations. Because Indian wars were rarely formally
declared, counting them is more challenging: I have included the war against the Northwest
Indian Confederacy (1790–95), Tecumseh’s War (1810–13), the Creek War (1813–14), the Black
Hawk War (1832), the Creek War of 1836, the First (1814–19), Second (1835–43), and Third
(1855–58) Seminole Wars, the Cayuse/Yakima/Rogue River War (1847–58), and the Paiute War
(1860). See generally HURT, supra note 474.
484. Articles on these topics that offer otherwise careful considerations of constitutional
history but omit serious discussion of Indian affairs include Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001); William Michael
Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power To Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1996);
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996). Professor John Yoo considers the Washington
administration’s war against the Northwest Indian Confederacy more fully, but ignores the role
of Indians in shaping the constitutional war powers, even though the sources from ratification
he cites repeatedly mention Indians. See id. at 271–72, 290–91.
485. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2074 (1999); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 410–17 (1998) (arguing based in
part on constitutional history for federalist limitations on the treaty power).
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under the Articles underscores—were considered self-executing.
Yet even scholars who have used constitutional history extensively to
critique this position and advance a nationalist interpretation of the
treaty power have similarly ignored Indian treaties, even though the
history recounted here powerfully supports their arguments, and even
487
when the sources they cite specifically mention Indians.
More fundamentally, focusing on Indian affairs challenges
traditional conceptions of what the Constitution was. Legal scholars
understandably privilege a view of the “Founding” as a legal and
intellectual event: a serene gathering of statesmen, well-versed in
European political philosophy and English legal thought, who
translated these abstractions into the foundation of a new
government intended to curb past abuses through a new American
488
“science of politics.” This vision stresses the document’s restraining
489
function through the mechanistic “checks and balances” that have

486. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 70–79 (1994). Congress generally appropriated money for treaty
purposes before a treaty was held and subsequently ratified any treaty; no further legislation
was required. See id.
487. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 616–19 (2008) (discussing the
inclusion of treaties within the Supremacy Clause as a response to the failures of the Articles,
but omitting Indian treaties). See generally, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2095 (1999) (critiquing Yoo’s historical claims, see Yoo, supra note 485, without discussing
Indian affairs); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (1999) (providing a
lengthy historical argument for a nationalist treaty power without mentioning Indian affairs). At
several points in Professor David Golove’s article, his sources explicitly discuss Indian treaties,
but he passes over this fact in silence. See Golove, supra, at 1167 n.278, 1178 n.317, 1179 n.319,
1243 n.557, 1278 n.695.
This issue has received renewed attention as the Supreme Court has heard Bond v.
United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 2013), which addresses whether the treaty power
authorizes Congress to criminalize local conduct. Yet even an amicus brief in the case filed by
professors of international law and legal history arguing in favor of a robust national treaty
power ignored Indian treaties, even though early Indian treaties routinely contained provisions
addressing criminal law within state boundaries. Brief for Amici Curiae Professors of
International Law and Legal History in Support of Respondent, Bond, No. 12-158, available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/12-158bsacProfsIntlLawandLegal
History-FINAL-ok-to-print.pdf; cf., e.g., Treaty of New York, supra note 442, arts. VIII–X
(addressing criminal law issues).
488. This is the predominant perspective and tone of the most influential intellectual history
of the Constitution of the last century. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969).
489. See FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 53, at 322 (James Madison).
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become shibboleths of our constitutional culture: limited government,
490
federalism, enumerated powers, and separation of powers.
This perspective, though valid, is partial. Integrating Indians into
our constitutional histories helps reveal how the Constitution was also
made outside Independence Hall—in the violent, pluralist
borderlands, where the United States contested with Native nations,
European empires, and states and squatters to assert sovereignty over
vast spaces of the continent. In 1783, the United States’s triumph in
this “Long War for the West” was, in words of one scholar, “the most
unlikely scenario of all,” a reality underscored by the disasters of the
491
Articles. Yet less than seventy years later, the federal government—
having expanded its jurisdiction to the Pacific, incorporated
seventeen new states, and forcibly removed most Indian nations from
492
east of the Mississippi River—was the contest’s undisputed victor.
This improbable success owed much to the conscious designs of the
Constitution’s drafters. All inhabited a world marked by a seemingly
perpetual crisis of authority on the frontier, and they crafted a
national government with formidable powers to address this
challenge: to create the extended republic envisioned by Madison by
493
expanding the nation and governing the West.
From this
perspective, the Constitution was not a document of restraint, but the

490. The literature on this topic is vast. For a historical view on the question, see JOHN
FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 19,
55–70 (2007).
491. François Furstenberg, The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic
History, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 647, 650 (2008). Professor François Furstenberg convincingly
argues that “the great problem of North American, and perhaps even Atlantic, history from
1754 to 1815 [was] the fate of the trans-Appalachian West.” Id. at 648. “[The] primary objective
[of the United States] after the Revolution was to become an independent nation-state; and as
many at the time recognized, the greatest obstacles to that ambition lay in the transAppalachian West.” Id. at 659. Furstenberg further notes that “[f]rom 1783 through the end of
the eighteenth century and beyond,” American sovereignty over the region was very much
uncertain; it could “be ensured only by overcoming three challenges: the geography of North
America, and of the Appalachian Mountains in particular; Native American resistance; and the
ambiguous loyalties of western colonists.” Id. Arguably, success in overcoming all three was
partially attributable to the new Constitution and the strengthened federal state it created.
492. See HOWE, supra note 457, at 852–55. See generally Frymer, supra note 478.
493. See FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 53, at 81–84 (James Madison). On the importance
of federal authority in the early American West, see Bethel Saler, An Empire for Liberty, a State
for Empire: The U.S. National State Before and After the Revolution of 1800, in THE
REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 360 (James Horn, Jan
Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2002). See generally WILLIAM H. BERGMANN, THE
AMERICAN NATIONAL STATE AND THE EARLY WEST (2012); EDLING, supra note 23; Frymer,
supra note 478.
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foundation of what historians have increasingly recognized as a
powerful early national state, whose authority was strongest on its
494
peripheries. “[T]he American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains
of consolidation, is about to convert this country into a powerful and
mighty empire,” warned Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratification
495
convention. Henry’s prescience foretold much Native suffering.
Natives were among the first subjects of this empire, but they
were not the last. In the creation of the Constitution, as in much of
early American history, Indian affairs were a central site of American
496
state formation, prefiguring later imperial projects. The Federalists’
strategic deployment of the rhetoric of savagery anticipated future
debates, as Indians became the stock template for America’s
subsequent cross-cultural encounters, their supposed primitiveness
evolving into a free-floating discourse to justify rule over other
497
purportedly inferior peoples. At the same time, the legal and
constitutional structures created to dispossess Natives and control the
West—the national fiscal-military state, federal territorial plenary
power, the exclusion of subject peoples from the privileges of
representation and citizenship—became the bases of America’s later

494. For recent scholarship emphasizing the strength of the early national state, see
BALOGH, supra note 16; EDLING, supra note 23; Frymer, supra note 478; William J. Novak, The
Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008).
495. Virginia Convention Debates (June 5, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 347, at 943, 959. Empire was a common
theme in the ratification debates, invoked by both Federalists and Anti-Federalists. For
thoughtful considerations of this aspect of ratification, see HULSEBOSCH, supra note 8, at 210–
58; JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 77–89 (2002).
496. For arguments emphasizing the centrality of Natives to the construction of the
American national state, see BALOGH, supra note 16, at 151–218; ROCKWELL, supra note 16, at
1–8; Jeff Pasley, Midget on Horseback: American Indians and the History of the American State,
COMMON-PLACE (Oct. 2008), http://www.common-place.org/vol-09/no-01/pasley.
497. See, e.g., REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 210–12, 239–44 (1981) (describing the use of antiIndian rhetoric to justify the conquest and dispossession of Mexicans); Brian Rouleau, Maritime
Destiny as Manifest Destiny: American Commercial Expansionism and the Idea of the Indian, 30
J. EARLY REPUBLIC 377, 379 (2010) (“By the nineteenth century, Native Americans . . . became
a stereotyped frame of reference applied to peoples encountered outside the continental
context.”). See generally RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIANHATING AND EMPIRE BUILDING 232–401 (1980) (emphasizing the connection between “Indianhating” and American imperial projects in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and southeast Asia).
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498

global empire. Unwittingly and unwillingly, Natives were the
handmaidens of the United States’s imperial Constitution.
As this narrative suggests, including Indians in constitutional
histories also raises questions about the Constitution’s complicity in
historical injustice. Most scholarship on this issue, unsurprisingly, has
addressed the Constitution’s paradigmatic moral failure: its
499
entrenchment of chattel slavery. There are important similarities,
for the issues of Natives and slavery were closely intertwined.
Southern states’ land hunger stemmed from the plantation complex’s
imperative for ceaseless expansion, as Georgia and other states
rapidly populated formerly Creek and Cherokee land with enslaved
500
Moreover, like its entanglement with slavery, the
Africans.
Constitution’s commitment to the expropriation of Native lands
enshrined a practice many at the time considered morally abhorrent
501
to secure the more immediate goal of union. The delegates
themselves made a connection: at the Convention, Charles Pinckney

498. For works emphasizing the links between the laws governing Indians and other
American imperial projects, see Lauren Benton, Colonizing Hawai’i and Colonizing Elsewhere:
Toward a History of U.S. Imperial Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 835 (2004) (book review); Sarah
H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002); Patrick Wolfe,
Corpus Nullius: The Exception of Indians and Other Aliens in US Constitutional Discourse, 10
POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 127 (2007). The legal structures of American empire are explored in
COLONIAL CRUCIBLE: EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE (Alfred
W. McCoy & Francisco A. Scarano eds., 2009); and GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
(2004). A thorough examination of the historical connection between American empire and
military power appears in FRED ANDERSON & ANDREW CAYTON, THE DOMINION OF WAR:
EMPIRE AND LIBERTY IN NORTH AMERICA, 1500–2000 (2005).
499. The literature on this subject is large. For the most recent historical treatments, see
generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 28–47 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001);
VAN CLEVE, supra note 240; WALDSTREICHER, supra note 240; Finkelman, supra note 240; Earl
M. Maltz, The Idea of the Proslavery Constitution, 17 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 37 (1997).
500. For discussions of the link between expansionism and the rise of the Cotton Belt in
former Indian lands, see HOWE, supra note 457, at 125–32; WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK
DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE COTTON KINGDOM 18–45 (2013); ADAM ROTHMAN,
SLAVE COUNTRY: AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE DEEP SOUTH 37–72
(2005); Countryman, supra note 29, at 360–61. Twenty-two years after ratification, as Georgia
rapidly expanded into Creek and Cherokee territory, the state’s slave population had tripled to
over 100,000. IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF
SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 370 tbl.1 (1998).
501. Cf. HENDRICKSON, supra note 18, at 240 (“Injustice to African-Americans and
injustice to Indian nations—a constitutional obligation to protect and even advance the slave
power, an acknowledged duty to dispossess the Indian nations of the interior—were by this
powerful logic woven into the inner fabric of their beautiful union.”).
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of South Carolina deflected a heated attack on the Three-Fifths
Compromise with the contention that “the Western frontier [is] more
502
burdensome to the U.S. than the slaves.”
But the constitutional history of Indian affairs also presents
503
different challenges for the contemporary Constitution than slavery.
Unlike the document’s frequent (albeit oblique) references to slavery,
nothing in the constitutional text explicitly mandates an imperialist
Indian policy. For a textualist, this may absolve the document from its
unpleasant historical associations. Yet in practice this absence has
made the effects of this history all the more insidious. Although
slavery’s legacy persists in profound ways, its appearance in the
Constitution forced the nation to confront African-Americans’ status
as a constitutional issue; the struggle to repudiate that history yielded
powerful tools to further an antiracist constitutional agenda. The
Constitution remains silent, however, on Native struggles to
overcome our nation’s historical injustices. Even as views on Indians
504
have shifted dramatically, Native nations remain legally a quasiconquered people, subject to the plenary power of a sovereign
505
created in part to dispossess them. The idea of the “savage” as an
enemy justifying expansive federal military power survives, too: the
U.S. Justice Department has claimed that precedent from nineteenthcentury Indian wars legitimizes current practices in the War on Terror
and the U.S. military codenamed Osama bin Laden “Geronimo,”

502. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 223.
503. The contrast I draw here concerns implications for present-day constitutional doctrine
and theory, not the ahistorical and unhelpful question of whether slavery or the dispossession of
Indians constitutes the greater “constitutional evil,” as Professor Mark Graber terms the
Constitution’s entrenchment of slavery. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006). Moreover, my contrast at the level of doctrine and theory
should not obscure the now neglected historical reality that chattel slavery was an integral part
of Native dispossession: enslavement of Indians was a widespread practice in the EuroAmerican colonies that persisted into the nineteenth century. See Gregory Ablavsky, Comment,
Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and
Its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1463–67, 1515–17 (2011).
504. See generally Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 591 (2008).
505. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“The ‘central function of the
Indian Commerce Clause,’ we have said, ‘is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate
in the field of Indian affairs.’” (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,
192 (1989))). But see Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565–71 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (questioning the doctrine of plenary power based on the purported “original
understanding” of the Indian Commerce Clause).
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506

after the nineteenth-century Apache chief. The problem is not that
federal Indian policy has not changed; prompted by Native activism,
the federal government has made significant, if incomplete, strides
toward respecting Native nations as separate, self-governing
507
sovereigns. But considering the history of Indian conquest and
dispossession as incidental to the Constitution has allowed doctrines
crafted to justify this process to endure, as if they could be abstracted
508
from their imperial origins.
These doctrines’ persistence
underscores that, for Natives, the history traced here has not yet
ended.
The other contrast is at the level of constitutional theory.
Originalists reassure themselves that the Constitution’s entanglement
with slavery represented a concession to the unfortunate realities of
the time that has since been expunged from the text, and so need not
trouble their normative conclusion that the original meaning of the
509
Constitution ought to continue to govern. This Article does not
delve into the dense and tangled thicket of constitutional theorizing
concerning interpretive methods, nor does it examine this account’s
merits as a description of slavery’s historical and constitutional

506. Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Peter S. Vicaire, Indian Wars: Old & New, 15 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 201, 223–30 (2012); Karl Jacoby, Op-Ed, Dishonored, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2011,
at A11; see also DRINNON, supra note 497, at 402–67 (describing the links between the history of
Indian-hating and the Vietnam War). For a discussion of ongoing uses of tropes of “savagery” in
current law and policy, see Ann E. Tweedy, “Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws,
Wolves, . . . Bears . . . Grizzlies and Things Like That?” How the Second Amendment and
Supreme Court Precedent Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687, 737–54 (2011).
507. See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS 177–268 (2006) (tracing the role of Native activism in creating a federal Indian policy
founded on tribal self-determination).
508. This is epitomized by recent Supreme Court doctrine, which has interpreted Marshall’s
long-ago proclamation of Native sovereigns as “domestic dependent nations,” Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), to impose significant quasi-constitutional restrictions on
Natives’ exercise of sovereignty. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–67
(1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206–08 (1978); cf. Lara, 541 U.S. at
228 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s “previous understanding of the
jurisdictional implications of dependent sovereignty was constitutional in nature”). For criticism
of this line of cases, see generally DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, Jr., LIKE
A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF
RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).
509. For discussions of the implications of slavery for originalism, see RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 111–12 (2004);
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 176–77 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007);
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO.
L.J. 1693, 1757–64 (2009).
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implications. Nonetheless, the history presented here questions the
empirical foundation for this originalist argument. Slavery was not an
island of oppression in a sea of liberty. Rather, the creation of a
democratic republic necessarily rested on the exclusion and
510
marginalization of others.
Particularly in Indian affairs, the
enforcement of racial and other hierarchies, and the expansion of
white “civilization” across the American continent, were among the
fundamental purposes of both the national and local state in early
511
America. By offering too-easy answers derived from a blinkered
focus on slavery, then, originalists have failed to grapple with these
deeper normative questions about their project to employ eighteenthcentury meanings to govern a twenty-first-century nation.
Expanding focus beyond slavery to include Indian affairs also
troubles understandings of constitutional history that privilege federal
power to remedy injustice. The fundamental protection of slavery in
the Constitution was the protection of state sovereignty and the
512
adoption of a limited federal government of enumerated powers. In
a similar vein, conventional accounts posit that federal indifference
undid the promise of Reconstruction and allowed Jim Crow to
flourish until the civil-rights movement, when federal power became a
513
critical tool for combating racial injustice. This narrative elides deep

510. See, e.g., HINDERAKER, supra note 475, at 268–70 (“[I]t is no accident that the
exploitation of nonwhite peoples in the United States deepened and intensified before it began
to be ameliorated. The Revolution liberated white men to pursue their economic and political
independence.”); EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 386 (1975) (“Racism became an essential, if
unacknowledged, ingredient of the republican ideology that enabled Virginians to lead the
nation.”); SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 1–43, 465–68 (arguing that early American
national identity was founded “on systematic patterns of exclusion”); JOHN WOOD SWEET,
BODIES POLITIC: NEGOTIATING RACE IN THE AMERICAN NORTH, 1730–1830, at 3–5, 399–407
(2003) (exploring how American democracy “was shaped by the legacy of colonial conquest,
enslavement, and racial domination”); WOOD, supra note 16, at 508–42 (observing that the
marginalization and racialization of African-Americans “were the strange and perverse
consequences of republican equality and democracy”); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI,
REVOLUTIONARY BACKLASH: WOMEN AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
180 (2007) (noting that, in early America, “[u]niversal male suffrage was increasingly defined
against—even predicated on—women’s and blacks’ exclusion from governance”).
511. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 457, at 852–54 (identifying as the “primary driving force” in
the antebellum United States “the domination and exploitation of the North American
continent by the white people of the United States and their government”).
512. See Finkelman, supra note 240, at 443–45 (describing the restriction on federal
authority as the “ultimate” protection of slavery in the Constitution).
513. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877, at 564–612 (1988).
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federal involvement in perpetuating discrimination against African514
Americans, but it is particularly inapposite in the realm of Indian
affairs, where the federal government was the primary actor in
marginalizing and dispossessing Native nations. Natives’ experience
underscores that our racial and constitutional injustices were not
simply a product of national acquiescence in local prejudices, and
cannot always be solved by enforcing a national consensus on
recalcitrant states.
CONCLUSION
In August 1788, Josiah Harmar commanded the entire federal
military—a little over five hundred men, strung out in a series of
isolated forts along nearly eight hundred miles of the Ohio and
515
Wabash Rivers. Reduced to eating spoiled bread and short on
funds, Harmar and his men watched in impotent fury as Natives
516
attacked surveyors and squatters who ventured into Indian country.
Anxious for relief, Harmar closely followed political events further
east. On August 7, he wrote his aide that news had at last reached his
remote outpost: “New Hampshire has adopted the new Constitution,
which makes the tenth state. I am in hopes the wheels of government
will now be soon put in motion, in order that we may be enabled to
extirpate these perfidious savages if they continue committing
517
hostilities.”
Harmar’s hopes were never quite realized. Natives survived, and,
for the past half century, have turned to the federal courts to hold the
government to the treaty promises it made long ago—have invoked,
514. See generally FEHRENBACHER, supra note 499.
515. See William B. Skelton, The Confederation’s Regulars: A Social Profile of Enlisted
Service in America’s First Standing Army, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 770, 781 (1989) (noting that the
army averaged 520 men during this period); see also WILLIAM H. GUTHMAN, MARCH TO
MASSACRE; A HISTORY OF THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1784–
1791, at 1–90 (1975) (describing the federal military during this period); KOHN, supra note 471,
at 54–72 (describing the weakness and financial difficulties of the Confederation army).
According to data supplied by the Army Corps of Engineers, the river distance from Fort
Harmar (present-day Marietta, Ohio) to Post Vincennes (present-day Vincennes, Indiana) is
782 miles. See Email from John D. Cheek, P.E., Great Lakes and Ohio River Div., U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, to Alvin L. Dong (Sept. 4, 2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
516. OUTPOST ON THE WABASH, supra note 145, at 93–105.
517. Letter from Josiah Harmar to John Hamtramck (Aug. 7, 1788), in OUTPOST ON THE
WABASH, supra note 145, at 99, 100; see also Letter from Brigadier-Gen. Harmar to Henry
Knox, Sec’y of War (July 23, 1788), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 97, at 64, 64 (“I
sincerely hope that the new government will soon begin to operate, in order that we may be
enabled to sweep these perfidious villains [the hostile Indians] off the face of the earth.”).
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in other words, the Madisonian Constitution to remedy injustice. But
for much of American history, the “wheels of government” proved
remarkably effective at dispossessing Natives of the continent. In this
respect, the Constitution functioned just as Harmar, and many others,
had envisioned.

